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THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND THE
LONG-AND-SHORT-HAUL PROBLEM
CONSIDER a railroad, running from A to C through an intermediate point,
B, whose managers charge a greater rate when goods shipped from A are
unloaded at B than when they are carried through B to C, many miles more
distant. This type of rate disparity, known as long-and-short-haul discrim-
ination,1 appears at first blush to penalize the intermediate point outrageously;
but the prevalence of the practice suggests that a consideration of its under-
lying causes might temper that first impression.
Competition is the theme central to all long-and-short-haul discriminations.
The tremendous expansion of the railroads towards the end of the nineteenth
century produced wasteful duplication of rail facilities which caused direct
1. The only discussions devoted exclusively to the long-and-short-haul problem which
have been found are DEwEY, Mm LoNG AND SHORT HAUL PJCXLE oV RATE REOULA-
ON (1935), reviewed by Shulman (1936) 45 YA= L .J. 558; Vanderblue, The Long
and Short Haul Clause Since 1910 (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 426. Howeve, most standard
works on railroads include some discussion of this problem.
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competition between railroads serving the same localities.2 The rail carriers
also have met direct competition from other modes of transportation, such as
waterways,3 pipe-lines,4 and, more recently, motor carriers.5  Further, market
competition at the terminal points is an indirect form of competition relevant
to long-and-short-haul discrimination. Market competition results when point
A, a center of production,0 or point C, a center of distribution,7 is at a
geographical disadvantage with respect to competing localities which must be
neutralized if A or C is to survive in the economic struggle and if freight is
to move between them. To meet this competition of routes and of markets,8
railroads are compelled to reduce the rates between the terminal competitive
points, such as A and C. The urgent need for revenue, however, requires that
the rates to intermediate non-competitive points, such as B, be maintained at
a higher level.9
It is argued in justification of long-and-short-haul discrimination as a method
of permitting the railroads to retain a substantial portion of the traffic moving
between the competitive terminal points that the large investment in the rail-
road system makes it a matter of public interest that the rail carriers be
favored over other forms of transportation.'0 It is also pointec out that where
there are alternative transportation facilities between A and C, long-and-short-
haul discrimination does not actually discriminate against the non-competitive
point B, since C already enjoys the advantage of lower rates on the alternate
route. Finally, it is contended on behalf of the railroads that long-and-short-
2. Although in 1890 there were but 7310 miles of railroad in the United States, by
1873 the mileage had increased to 68,435, and in 1S93 bad reached 177,0D. See LIU=,
RAIWAY TRASPORTAriON (1924) 80-S3, 88-90, 122; cf. RiPLLT, RAIrnO.DS, RATES AND
REGuLATroN (1912) 11-35, 78. A major cause of this rapid growth was the extensve
public aid extended to the railroads. See AOLY, RAn o %O TmA.sronTr,*o:. (1896)
37-3S; IuLER, supra, 92-98. It has been estimated that the public contributed to rail-
way construction $700,000,000 as well as 215,000,000 acres of land, an area equivalent
to that of the State of Texas. See DEwar, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20.
3. The greatest canal and river prosperity was between 1840 and 1870. See BMou r:O,
WATERWAYS VERSUS RAmWAYS (2d ed. 1926) 69. In 1865, the annual tonnage of the
Erie Canal was 4,729,654 tons, while the annual tonnage of the -ailroads competing with
the canal was but 3,609,640. See SEN. Rrp. No. 46, 49th Cong, 1st Sf-s. (1886) 172
(Cullom Report).
4. See infra p. 1440. 5. See infra p. 1442.
6. For a more complete discussion of production market competition, see infra p. 143.
7. For a more complete discussion of distribution market competition, se infra p. 1452.
8. Professor Dewey cites as the reasons fo'r the existence of this competition which
creates long-and-shot-haul discrimination (1) the historical overbuilding of railroads:,
(2) the lack of permanently effective public regulation until 1910, and (3) the nature
of the railway industry-the monopoly character of local but not through traffic, and
the tendency toward decreasing and joint costs. DEwEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 19-25.
9. See 1sT. AwN. REP. I. C. C. (1887) 16. An actual investigation showed that the
application of the low competitive rate as a maximum for charges to intermediate points in
southern territory in 1911 would have caused a loss of 6.73% of the total freight earning,
which would have wiped out the surplus of 20 lines in that territory. See Fourth Section
Violations in the Southeast, 30 I. C. C. 153, 159-162 (1914).
10. See infra notes 64, 65, 66.
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haul discrimination, by increasing the gross revenues of the road more than, the
bare out-of-pocket costs of the long haul, benefits intermediate points to the
extent that it helps defray the overhead charges which the traffic on the short
haul would otherwise have to meet.
Railroad rates, however, have far more significant repercussions than their
effect upon rail revenues; for the economic welfare of entire regions depends
upon the level at which they are maintained. On behalf of the intermediate
points, which usually are smaller communities, the argument is made that
long-and-short-haul discriminations give undue preference to the larger terminal
points and tend to stifle economic activity at other points. This is particularly
true when the reason for the long-and-short-haul discrimination is not the
existence of a competing route between the terminal points, but rather is the
attempt on the part of the terminal points to extend their sources of raw
materials and their markets by exerting pressure on the railroad to reduce rates.
Competing lines and modes of transportation, which can carry freight between
the terminal points at lower costs and could perform the service at a lower
rate were it not for the long-and-short-discrimination, also attack the practice.
In its competition with alternative transportation facilities to the terminal point,
the railroad, in effect, is subsidized by the greater charge imposed for the
shorter haul, and in this manner is enabled to stifle effectively the development
of more economical agencies of transportation. In addition to discriminating
against intermediate localities and against competing carriers, long-and-short-
haul discrimination also meets the objection that it constitutes a gross departure
from the distance principle which, in theory at least, has been widely accepted
as the proper criterion for rate-making.1 The distance principle, under which
rates should vary in general with the relative cost of transportation, permits
regions favorably located with respect to raw materials, labor, and centers of
population to take advantage of their geographical position by producing goods
and shipping them to market at a low total cost. Long-and-short-haul dis-
crimination, departing from that principle by imposing a greater monetary
charge for a shorter haul, neutralizes the natural advantages of intermediate
points and tends to decrease the national income by encouraging uneconomic
and wasteful long hauls.
There can be no easy solution of the problem of long-and-short-haul dis-
crimination. No one argument on either side of the dispute is economically
conclusive, nor do considerations of policy clearly point to a simple solution.
Furthermore, the struggle of the railroads for increased revenues, the pressure
of terminal points seeking to extend their markets and sources of raw materials for
lower rates, and the efforts of non-competitive intermediate points to prevent
long-and-short-haul discrimination present bitter clashes of vital economic
interests rather than problems of economic theory or abstract policy. Economic
planning through the readjustment of rates presents further difficulty. An
attempt to redistribute population more widely would meet the opposition of
11. See ALLDREDGE, RATE MAxIG FOR COMMON CAImERS (1929) 79-84; DAcoETr,
PRIncIpLEs Or ILMD TRANsPORTATIOn. (2d ed. 1934) 360-375; DA1ESrs, Tu PmCz or
TRANSPORTATION SERvicE (1932) 72-81; DEwny, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46-66; Noyrt,
A. mscAN RAyLROAD RATES (1905) 36-55; RIPLEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 166-184;
VANDERBLuE & BURGESS, RAILROADS-RATES, SERVICE, MANAOEMENT (1923) 139-196.
[Vol. 45t1428
commercial and industrial centers where population has clustered because of
the economic advantages arising from geographical location; and any planning
with the future in mind would be resisted by those interests and localities which
have a stake in the railroad rate structure as it exdsts today.
Whether railroad managers are to be permitted to control the economic
destinies of many localities through unrestricted long-and-short-haul discrim-
inations is now a closed question. The arbitrary rate discriminations against
persons and localities practiced by railroads during the seventies and eighties
of the last century'2 proved the point so well that Section 4 of the Interstate
Commerce Act 13 provided that "it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to charge or receive any greater compen-
sation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or of like kind of
property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter
than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter
being included within the longer distance .... ,"14 The prohibition of long-
and-short-haul discrimination, however, was not absolute. There was added to
Section 4 the qualification that "upon application to the (Interstate Commerce)
Commission ... such common carrier may, in special cases, after investigation
by the Commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than for shorter
distances for the transportation of passengers or property; and the Commision
may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated common
carrier may be relieved from the operation of this section of this act.'a 5
12. See M ILEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 137-139; Rnzx, op. cit. supra note 2, at
441-450; Szx. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886) (Cullom Report); lsr A,.:.
REP. I. C. C. (1887) 4-10.
13. 24 SrAr. 379 (1887). To prevent the discriminations which resulted from ex-
cesively high or low rates, it was provided in Section 1 that all rates had to be "reason-
able and just." Section 3 contained a general prohibition upon "any undue or un-
reasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation,
or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsover." Section 2,
making rebates unlawful, was a particular prohibition concerning persons. Likew-ise,
Section 4, containing the long-and-short-haul principle, was a specific prohibition concern-
ing places. Sections 2 and 4 stood in the statute as definite rules on either side of the
general and indefinite provision in Section 3 against undue preferences. See 7Tr Ami.
REP. I. C. C. (1893) 32. All these sections survived in substantially the same form
in the Transportation Act, 1920.
14. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1) (1926). This statute also provided that
this prohibition should "not be construed as authorizing any common carrier ... to charge
and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance." However, the
Commission in its early rulings ignored this clause. Rice v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Rr. Co.,
4 I. C. C. 228, 247 (1890); Ailk Producers' Protective Ass'n v. Delaware, L. & W. Rr. Co.,
7 I. C. C. 92, 163 (1897); see 4T Azw. REP. I. C. C. (1890) 38. And although this clause
was reenacted in the 1910 and 1920 amendments, 36 STAT. 547, 41 ST,r. 4S0, 49 U. S. C.
A. § 4 (1) (1926), the Commission has continued to ignore it, not only tacitly in the
approval of blanket rate adjustments but also expressly in certain instances. Cf. Birming-
ham Traffic Bureau v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 118 I. C. C. 756 (1926); Schaffner Bros. v.
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 177 I. C. C. 337 (1931).
15. It is interesting to note that seventeen of the states previous to the passage of the
Act to tegulate commerce had by statute or by constitutional amendment, beginning in
1850 and from then on to 1895, made illegal the charging of a greater compensation for
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The legislative development of Section 4 and the extent to which the Com-
mission has relieved carriers from its operation are the topics to be discussed
in this comment.'8
Although many rail carriers immediately commenced to adjust their rates tc
conform to this section,'17 some carriers, fearing that such a revision would
result in a drastic reduction of revenue, maintained the existing discriminatory
rates. When complaints as to the fairness of these rates were heard before the
newly created Interstate Commerce Commission, interested railroads strenu-
ously defended the existing rate structure.'8 Although these railroads contended
that the competition of rail carriers subject to the act was such a "dissimilar
circumstance" as would justify a lower charge for a longer haul, the Com-
mission consistently refused to grant relief for this cause alone,' 9 for the reason
transportation by railroad for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line in
the same direction. Some of these provisions were broad, others wete narrow; but in all
but one of these states, the particular rule prescribed admitted of no exceptions. See 4TH
Axx. REP. I. C. C. (1890) 39-43.
16. This comment does not discuss passenger rates. Although Section 4 applies to
passenger fares as well as to freight rates, comparatively few cases arise which concern
the former. See 25rH Amr. REP. I. C. C. (1911) 21. Only with the greatest difficulty
could railroads maintain higher rates for shorter than for longer hauls. A passenger going
from A to an intermediate point B can purchase a, ticket to the distant point C yet can get
off the train at B. Likewise, a passenger going from B may send to A, buy a ticket good
from A to C, and use it from B to C. For an exhaustive discussion of current passenger
traffic problems, see Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Passenger Traffic Report
(1935).
Nor does this comment concern the suits of individual shippers for recovery of charges
collected by the railroads which are illegal under Section 4. This comment considers only
the attempts of the railroads to obtain prospective relief from Section 4.
17. See 1ST AwN. REP. I. C. C. (1887) 20-21; 2D ANN. Rap. I. C. C. (1888) 14-15;
3D AwN. RE. I. C. C. (1889) 46.
18. The carriers claimed that the following conditions were such dissimilar circumstances
and conditions as would justify under Section 4 lower charges to the long haul points. (1)
The short haul is of local traffic while the long haul is of through traffic; (2) the low rato
for the long haul encouraged manufactures and trade at that point; (3) the cost of carry-
ing local traffic is greater than that of through traffic; (4) the traffic carried to the distant
point cannot move at a higher rate; (5) railroads would go bankrupt were the rate system
changed. In re Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 1 I. C. C. 31, 60-71 (1887); cf. Railroad Com-
mission of Georgia v. Clyde S. S. Co., 5 1. C. C. 326, 378-388 (1892).
19. In re Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 1 I. C. C. 31, 81 (1887); In Ye Chicago, St. P. &
K. C. Ry. Co., 2 I. C. C. 231, 263-270 (1888); In re Tariffs & Classifications of Atlanta
& W. P. Rr. Co., 3 I. C. C. 19, 78 (1889); Hamilton & Brown v. Chattanooga, R. & C.
Rr. Co., 4 I. C. C. 686 (1891); Railroad Commission of Georgia v. Clyde S. S. Co., 5
I. C. C. 324, 404, 411 (1892).
This rule was not without exception, for in certain "rare and peculiar" cases relief was
granted. See 11TH ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1895) 102; cf. In re Louisville & N, R. Co., I
I. C. C. 31, 81-83 (1887); Wright Wire Co. v. Pittsburg & L. E. Rr. Co., 21 I. C. C. 64
(1911).
Production market competition was not sufficient to warrant relief from Section 4.
Raworth v. Northern P. Rr. Co., 5 I. C. C. 234, 247-251 (1892); Behlmer v. Memphis &
C. Rr. Co., 6 I. C. C. 257 (1894). Nor was the competition of markets of distribution,
James & Mayer Buggy Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 4 I. C. C. 744 (1891);
Railroad Commission of Georgia v. Clyde S. S. Co., 5 I. C. C. 324, 403 (1892).
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that the chief purpose of the Act was to restrict ruthless competition between
carriers by rail which had resulted in many discriminatory practices. How-
ever, since carriers by water were subject to no governmental regulation and
thus were privileged to make whatever rates they pleased, the Commission early
held that the competition of waterways permitted the railroads to charge less
for a longer than for a shorter haul over the same line.20 For example, water
rates of 9 from New York to Boston justified the carriers by rail in meeting
this rate while charging 18 to Readville, Massachusetts, a few miles inland
from Boston.2 ' Likewise, the competition of railroads not subject to the Act,
such as completely intrastate lines and the Canadian Pacific Railway, was held
to justify railroads subject to the Act in making a lower charge for the longer
haul when there was active competition for carriage to the long haul point. -
Thus it is seen that the Commission in its early rulings adopted the policy
of permitting departures from Section 4 only in order to allow the regulated
carriers by rail to compete effectively with the unregulated rail and water
carriers.2
3
The courts, however, were not so willing to give effect to the spirit of the
20. In re Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 1 I. C. C. 31, 72 (1887); Rice v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Rr. Co., 4 I. C. C. 228, 242 (1890); Merchants' Union of Spokane Falls v. Northern
P. Rr. Co., 5 I. C. C. 478, 502 (1892); see Rice v. Cincinnati, W. & B. Rr. Co., S I. C. C.
193, 228 (1892); 11ITI ANr. R n. I. C. C. (1897) 41.
However, such permission was subject to the conditions that the competition by water
be real and not merely potential [Harwell v. Columbus & W. Rr. Co., 1 I. C. C. 236, 248
(1887); Brewer & Hanleiter v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 7 L C. C. 225, 235 (1897)], and
that the long haul charge give some revenue above the actual out-of-pocket cost of move-
ment and that the intermediate rates be fair and reasonable. Merchants' Union of Spokane
Falls v. Northern P. Rr. Co., 5 I. C. C. 478, 500, 505 (1892); cf. 4Tu Azmi. REP. I C. C.
(1890) 46.
21. King & Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. Rr. Co., 4 I. C. C. 251 (1890).
22. In re Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 1 I. C. C. 31, 80 (1887); Business Men's As'n v.'
Chicago, St. P., Ml. & 0. Ry. Co., 2 I. C. C. 52, 64-66 (1888); Rice v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Rr. Co., 4 I. C. C. 228, 244 (1890); see 11"n Air. REP. I. C. C. (1897) 41.
23. Since the Commission could not have handled the many applications for relief from
Section 4 were its permission required before a railroad could put into existence a lower
charge for a longer haul, it was early held that where dis lar circumstances did exi-t,
the rail carrier was privileged to establish a lower charge for a longer haul without pre-
liminary resort to the Commission. In re Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 1 I. C. C. 31, 5360
(1887); cf. Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 31 Fed. 862 (C. C. E. D. La.
1887). Thus, though the railroads had the privilege of judging in the first instance whether
they were justified in meeting through Section 4 departures the rates of water carriers and
of rail carriers not subject to the Act, an order of the Commission was required before any
departure could obtain to meet the competition of carriers subject to the Act. Railroad
Commission of Georgia v. Clyde S. S. Co., 5 I. C. C. 324, 383-400 (1892); Gerke Brewing
Co. v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 5 I. C. C. 596, 605-609 (1893); Board of Trade of
Lynchburg v. Old Dominion S. S. Co., 6 L C. C. 633, 645 (1896).
Of course, an interested party was free to test the legality of those rates established in
the first instance by the carrier, and, at the hearing, the burden of proof was upon the
carrier to justify the greater charge for the shorter haul. Gerke Brewing Co. v. Louisville
& N. Rr. Co., 5 I. C. C. 596, 611 (1893); Board of Trade of Troy v. Alabama Df. Ry.
Co., 6 I. C. C. 1, 15 (1893).
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Section. Shortly after the Act was passed, there arose the question of the
applicability of Section 4 to the situation wherein two or more separately
organized rail carriers had formed joint through rates.24 It was strenuously
urged by the Commission that "line" in Section 4 meant a physical line rather
than a business unit and hence that, though the portion of a joint rate allotted
to one carrier might be less than the carrier's local rate over the same distance,
the aggregate joint rate should be greater than the local rate between any
two points on the joint line.2 5 Yet the lower federal courts, refusing to follow
this interpretation, held that "line" meant a business unit.2 0  Under this
interpretation, two rail carriers could form a joint rate from San Francisco
to Kansas City of 65 while charging 94 to a Kansas point nearer San Francisco
than Kansas City, on the theory that the latter rate was a combination of the
local rates on each line while the former rate was a joint rate and hence con-
stituted a new "line." Thus, joint rates were completely independent of local
rates, and the purpose of Section 4 was largely vitiated.
Though the judicial interpretation of "line" as a business unit had rendered
Section 4 less effective in curbing long-and-short-haul abuses, a far greater
blow to the efficacy of that Section was struck by the Alabama Midland
decision in 1897. Upon complaint that higher rates were being charged from
the east to Troy, Alabama, than to Montgomery, 52 miles beyond, the Com-
mission had ordered that this discrimination cease.2 7  When the Alabama
Midland Railway failed to conform to this order, the Commission instituted
suit in a federal court to compel obedience. On appeal, the Supreme Court,
dismissing the suit, held that the competition of rail carriers subject to the
Act might create such dissimilar circumstances as would justify a less charge
for a longer haul, and that such competition did exist at Montgomery. 28 This
decision had immediate effects. Within five days, the Trans-Missouri Freight
24. Under the 1887 Act, connecting railroads were under no duty to associate themselves
into a through route and to establish a joint through rate. See 57U ANN. Rar. 1. C. C.
(1891) 41-52. This duty was first declared in 1910, 36 STAT. 545, and was repeated in the'
Transportation Act, 1920. 41 STAT. 475, 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 (4) (1926). Of course, undey
the 1887 Act, carriers were under a duty to deliver goods to the connecting carrier. 24
STAT. 380, 49 U. S. C. A. § 3 (3) (1926).
25. Boston & A. Rr. Co. v. Boston & L. Rr. Co., 1 I. C. C. 158, 174-176 (1887); Lipp-
man & Co. v. Illinois C. Rr. Co., 2 I. C. C. 584 (1889) ; see 6vrH ANN. RFa. I. C. C. (1892)
32-37.
26. Chicago & N. V. Ry. Co. v. Osborne, 52 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1892), cert. denied,
146 U. S. 354 (1892); Tozer v. United States, 52 Fed. 917 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1892); United
States v. Mellen, 53 Fed. 229 (D. Kan. 1892). But cf. Cincinnati, N, 0. & T. P. Ry. Co.
v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 184 (1896); 10rH ANN. RzP. I C. C. (1896) 17-20; In re Violations
of Act to Regulate Commerce, 8 I. C. C. 290, 302 (1899).
27. Board of Trade of Troy v. Alabama M. Ry. Co., 6. I. C. C. 1 (1893).
28. I. C. C. v. Alabama M. Ry. Co., 168 U. S. 144 (1897). The court further held
that, when the competition of carriers subject to the Act existed at long haul points, rail
carriers could meet this competition through Section 4 departures without first obtaining
the permission of the Commission. This case was approved and followed in later cases,
Louisville & N. RYr. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648 (1900) ; East Tenneqsee, V. & G. Ry. Co.
v. I. C. C., 181 U. S. 1 (1901); I. C. C. v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 190 U. S. 273 (1903);
cf. Dallas Freight Bureau v. Austin & N. W. Rr. Co., 9 I. C. C. 68 (1901).
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Bureau raised rates to intermediate points over an area covering more than
100,000 square miles.2 9 The Commission in its Annual Report stated that
. .. the fourth section is by this decision eliminated from the act. .... 13
Since the competition of rail carriers at the terminal points had been the
principal force compelling railroads to lower rates on long hauls and since such
competition was held a dissimilar circumstance justifying discrimination in
terms of Section 4 departures, that Section was quite effectively emasculated.
The old practices with their great disparities in rates were largely revived, and
the Commission was powerless to prevent the consequent discrimination against
intermediate localities.30
After thirteen years of disuse, Section 4 was revived by the Mann-Elkins
Act of 1910.31 That Act amended Section 4 by eliminating the words "under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions" to make absolute the pro-
hibition upon a greater charge for a shorter distance. However, the proviso
was repeated that the Commission "in special cases" might permit departures
from this prohibition. Further, by applying this prohibition to any
"line or route," the distinction between a physical and a business unit
which had been used to evade the original act was rendered ineffective. 2
Finally, the statute added "the aggregate of intermediates" clause, which
prohibited a greater charge to the distant point than the sum of the in-
termediate rates 3 3 This amendment took from the carriers the power to
29. 11TH Aaur. REP. I. C. C. (1897) 43.
S0. See DswzY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 78; RiPLLY, op. cit. sapra note 2, at 481-484;
1 SmAnr=N, Tm I nTRsTATE CoacnEc ComaressIoN (1931) 30-32. Market competition
again justified lower rates for the longer haul. Gardner & Clark v. Southern Rr. Co., 10
I. C. C. 342 (1904) (production market); Commercial & Industrial As'n v. Louisville &
N. Rr. Co., 12 L C. C. 372 (1907) (distribution market); Bovaird Supply Co. v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 13 L C. C. 56 (1908) (production market); Columbia Grocery Co.
v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 18 L C. C. 502 (1910) (distribution market).
Yet there remained a few restrictions upon relief. The competition had to be material
and substantial. Louisville & N. Rr. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 675 (1900). Also,
the rates to the intermediate points had to be reasonable in themselves. L C. C. v.
Southern Ry. Co., 117 Fed. 741 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1902); Lehman-Higginson Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 10 I. C. C. 460, 472 (1905). Finally, the competitive rate
had to be above the cost of movement. Mayor of Wichita v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 9 I. C. C. 534, 555-556 (1903).
And since the burden of proof continued upon the carrier to justify the lower charge
to the more distant point [Phillips, Bailey & Co. v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 8 . C. C. 93,
lOS (1898)], such a charge would be illegal if dissimilar circumstances were not proved.
Hinton Fruit & Produce Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 17 L C. C. 578 (1910).
31. 36 STAT. 547, 49 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1926). Although the railroads immediately at-
tacked the constitutionality of this amendment, the Supreme Court upheld its validity in
the Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914). Cf. Tnoa-, Co,,smucriou iND Co:;-
sTInnuoAzr or THE LoxG AND SHORT HAuL CLAusE (1911).
32. Cf. Bennett & Son v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 38 I. C. C. 310 (1916).
33. Thus, if the rate from A to B were 15 and from B to C were 10, the rate from
A to C could not eaceed 25. For a discussion of this clause, see infra p. 1444.
The 1910 amendment also included another new provision, designed to prevent railroads
from destroying water competition [see Skinner & Eddy Corp v. United States, 249 U. S.
557, 567 (1919)], which provided that, if a railroad reduced its rates to a competitive point
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determine in the first instance the existence of conditions justifying a greater
charge for a shorter than for a longer distance, and vested it in the Commission."'
Thus, any Section 4 departure initiated by a rail carrier was illegal, even
though such departure might be exactly similar to other departures which had
been previously authorized by the Commission.8" This elimination of the
carrier's privilege to establish greater charges for shorter hauls upon its own
volition, which had existed under the original Section 4,80 had immediate effect.
Within one year more than 5000 applications were filed by rail carriers for
relief from Section 4,87 and since that time the handling of such applications
has constituted an important phase of the Commission's work.
In the Transportation Act of 1920, the 1910 amendment to the original
Section 4 was reenacted.88 Further, the 1920 act added certain instructions
to the Commission in its granting of relief-the "reasonably compensatory"
clause,89 which required that all rates established under authorized departures
be reasonably compensatory for the service performed; the "equidistant"
clause,40 applicable only to the situation of competing rail carriers, which set
forth certain mathematical restrictions upon relief; and the "potential water
competition" clause,41 which expressly prohibited relief on the ground of water
competition not actually in existence-which the Commission in some degree
had followed in its rulings before 1920.42 Since Section 4 of the Transportation
Act is still in force, it is today the statutory basis for long-and-short-haul
because of water competition, such rates could not be increased unless such Increase rested
upon changed conditions other than the elimination of water competition. 36 SrAT. 548.
This provision was reenacted in the Transpo rtation Act, 1920. 41 STAT. 480, 49 U. S. C. A.
§ 4 (2) (1926). By 1924, but three cases had arisen under this clause, See Administration
of Fourth Section, 87 I. C. C. 564, 605 (1924).
34. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914); United States v. Louisville & N.
Rr. Co., 235 U. S. 314 (1914); Rates on Boots and Shoes from Boston, 31 I. C. C, 154
(1914).
The burden of proof continued upon the carrier to justify the proposed departure.
Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co., 21 I. C. C. 329, 339 (1911); Trans-
continental Commodity Rates, West Bound, 26 I. C. C. 456 (1913).
35. Cf. Railroad Commissioners of Montana v. Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co., 31 1. C. C. 641,
652 (1914).
36. The Commission under the original Act had granted to the rail carriers the power
to initiate long-and-short-haul departures in certain instances [see supra note 231 and the
courts had extended this power. See supra note 28.
37. The amended act was approved June 18, 1910. By February 17, 1911, 5030 ap-
plications for relief under Section 4 were filed. And since only 4570 applications had been
filed from 1887 to 1910, the effect of this amendment upon the work of the Commission is
easily seen. See 25T A-N. R z. 1. C. C. (1911) 20-21.
38. 41 STAT. 480, 49 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1926).
39. For a discussion of this clause, see infra notes 50, 101.
40. For a discussion of this clause, see infra p. 1448.
41. For a discussion of this clause, see infra p. 1438.
42. Reasonably compensatory clause: Fourth Section Violations in the Southeast, 30
L C. C. 153, 175-177 (1914); Commodity Rates to Pacific Coast, 32 I. C. C, 611, 622
(1915). Equidistant clause: New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Louisville & N. Rr, Co., 46
I. C. C. 712, 748 (1917); Johnston v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 51 I. C. C. 356
(1918). Potential water competition clause: see infra p. 1438.
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railroad regulation. And as no court decision has been found which overrules
a Commission fourth-section order under the 1910 and 1920 Acts,4 4 the Com-
mission's interpretation of this Section comprises the existing case law upon
the long-and-short-haul clause.45
SE T oN 4 ORDERS UNDER THE 1910 AND 1920 Acis
A. Water Competition
In the early days of the Interstate Commerce Commission, since water
carriers consisted of small independent unorganized operators incapable of
exerting effective economic or political pressure for self-preservation, the Com-
mission allowed the railroads to meet and even to destroy water competition
whenever it was feasible from the point of view of the railroadsA Likewise,
under the 1910 amendment, the Commission consistently held that actual
compelling water competition justified departures from Section 4 at the point
of competition.47  Thus, for example, railroads were permitted to charge 255
43. As the statute applies only to "like kind of property . . .over the same line or
route," thee is no violation of Section 4 when different commodities or different units
of the same commodity are involved. In the Matter of Container Service, 173 I. C. C.
37, 440 (1931).
The long and short haul provision does not apply to intrastate movements. Tuffli Bros.
v. Southern P. Co., 200 L C. C. 151 (1934). And since the Commission has no power
over Canadian and Mexican railroads, questions of jurisdiction alise concerning rail -hp-
ments to these countries. Section 4 is applicable if the intermediate and distant points are
located in the United States, even though the point of origin be in a foreign country.
Duluth Iron & Metal Co. v. Director General, 89 I. C. C. 343 (1924). And though the
point of destination be in a foreign country, the Commission has jurisdiction if the
original and intermediate points are within the United States. Commodity Rates to Mexico,
209 L C. C. 370 (1935). In this manner the Commission can protect points in the United
States against discriminatory rates. Of course, if the intermediate point is in a foreign
country while the points of origin and destination are in the United States, no protection
is needed, and so the Commission has refused to take jurisdiction over alleged violations
arising out of this situation. Botner v. Gulf Coast Lines, 192 L C. C. 503 (1933).
44. Cf. Dewey, op. cit. slpr note 1, at 253.
45. Since each Section 4 oder concerns the balancing of many interests, private as well
as public, each case must stand upon its own facts, and no one situation can ever furnissh
an exact precedent for another. Bluefield Shippers Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 22
I. C. C. 519, 526 (1912); cf. Danville v. Southern Ry. Co., 8 I. C. C. 409, 426 (190D). How-
ever, the many orders can be classified and compared to a cettain extent.
46. See supra p. 1431. That the railroads through various competitive methods had by
1900 practically destroyed the water catriers is well-known. See MouL,:ro., op. cit. supra
note 3, at 69-97.
47. Long and Short Haul Docket No. 1243, 22 I. C. C. 366 (1912); Fourth Section
Applications Nos. 542 et seq., 25 I. C. C. 50, 54 (1912); Gills & Son v. Philadelphia, B.
& W. Rr. Co., 26 I. C. C. 61 (1913).
Of course, the rate to the distant point, established in view of water competition, had
to be lower than would otherwise be reasonable. In Te Transportation of Wool, 23 1.
C. C. 151, 178 (1912); Fourth Section Violations in the Southeast, 30 I. C. C. 153, 173
(1914). Also, the rates to the intermediate points had to be reasonable in themselve3,
and there could not result any undue discrimination against these points. Railroad Coin-
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less from New York to Seattle than from New York to Spokane, some 400
miles inland, because of water competition between New York and Seattle.
48
However, with the development of the American Merchant Marine, greatly
accelerated by the demands for ships during the world war, sentiment devel-
oped in favor of protecting water carriers against excessive competition, and
this change of feeling was reflected in Section 500 of the Transportation
Act, 1920, which provided that "it is declared to be the policy of
Congress to promote, encourage, and develop water transportation, service, and
facilities in connection with the commerce of the United States, and to foster and
preserve in full vigor both rail and water transportation." 49 Under this declara-
tion of policy, the Commission is required to weigh the proposed benefit to the
rail carriers caused by the traffic gain which results from the Section 4 departure
against the proposed detriment to the water carriers caused by the loss of that
traffic which will move by rail under the new low rate. Further, the Transporta-
tion Act provided that in no case could a railroad establish a charge to a distant
point that was not "reasonably compensatory for the service performed."50
Consequently, although the Commission since 1920 has continued to grant
Section 4 relief to rail carriers in order to meet compelling water competition,t
1
mission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co., 21 I. C. C. 329, 368 (1911); In re Transportation
of Wool, 23 I. C. C. 151, 178 (1912).
If the railroad seeking relief had such a community of interest with the water carrier
that competitive conditions were purely artificial, it was held that Section 4 Yelief wag not
justified. Bowling Green Business Men v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 24 I. C. C. 228 (1912).
It is interesting to note that in the Panama Canal Act of 1912, railroad ownership or con-
trol of any competing water carrier was made illegal. 37 STAT. 566, 567, 49 U. S. C. A.
§§ 5 (10) (12) (1926).
And if the same water competition existed at both the intermediate and the distant
point, there was no cause for departure from Section 4. Chamber of Commerce v.
Baltimore & 0. RJ. Co., 30 I. C. C. 446, 453 (1914).
48. City of Spokane v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 21 1. C. C. 400, 426 (1911).
49. 41 STAT. 499 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 142 (1926).
50. 41 STAT. 480 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1) (1926). "Reasonably compensatory"
was held to imply that a rate must (1) more than cover the additional expense incurred
in handling the traffic to which it applies; (2) be no lower than nececsary to meet existing
competition; (3) not be so low as to threaten the extinction of legitimate competition by
water carriers; and (4) not impose an undue burden on other traffic or jeopardize the
appropriate return on the value of carrier property generally. Transcontinental Cases
of 1922, 74 I. C. C. 48, 68-71 (1922) ; cf. Pacific Coast Fourth Section ApplicatIong, 129
I. C. C. 3, 15-19 (1927). For a fu'rther discussion of this clause, see infra note 101.
51. Commodity Rates from Jacksonville to Miami, 101 I. C. C. 347 (1925); Pacific
Coast Fourth Section Applications, 129 I. C. C. 3 (1927), 165 1. C. C. 373 (1930). Relief
need not be confined to an all-rail route, for it has been held that a joint rail-and-water
route may obtain Section 4 relief in order to compete upon more equal tetms with an all
water route. Transcontinental Cases of 1922, 74 I. C. C. 48, 83-89 (1922). And the go-
called water competition may in fact be caused by a joint rail-and-water line. Thus,
relief has been granted to a rail line from Montana points to San Francisco in order to meet
the competition of a route from Montana points to Seattle by rail and thence by water
to San Francisco. Canned Goods from Montana, 102 I. C. C. 3 (1925); cf. Commodity
Rates to South Atlantic Ports, 186 I. C. C. 675 (1932); Corporation Commission of New
Mexico v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 34 I. C. C. 292, 301 (1915).
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proposed departures have been frequently refused even though it is clear that
actual water competition does exist.5 2  Whether these denials of relief are
based upon the public interest in maintaining water carriers or upon the
ground that the proposed rates will not be reasonably compensatory is difficult
to determine from the reports of the Commission.6
3
This trend toward the protection of water carriers, however, apparently
has been interrupted in the past few years. For the Commission, impressed
by the great need of rail carriers for additional revenue, has granted relief
in several recent cases to the carriers by rail in order to meet barge competi-
tion on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers,5 4 freighter competition on the Great
Lakes, 55 and the competition of coast-wise steamers along the Gulf Coast and
Atlantic seaboard. 0 Although these particular departures are not numerous
enough to justify the generalization that railroads once again are destroying
water transportation in this country, yet they may be warnings of a recru-
descence of such a rate-making policy.
5 7
Since the cost of movement of goods by water is generally less than the
cost of shipment by rail between the same points, 8 it might seem impossible
for railroads to destroy water carriers through competition even if the pro-
52. Wool Rates Investigation, 1923, 91 I. C. C. 235, 239-249 (1924); Class Rates to
Jacksonville, 157 I. C. C. 215 (1929); Gasolene and Kerosene to Nashville, 20D I. C. C.
676 (1934); Petroleum Products from St. Louis District, 203 I. C. C. 783 (1934); Tran-
continental Westbound Automobile Rates, 209 I. C. C. 549 (1935).
Water traffic has shown a tremendous increase since 1920. For example, intercoastal
traffic through the Panama Canal grew from 1,372,000 long tons in 1921 to 10,490,00 long
tons in 1930. Also, traffic in the Ohio river has increased from 9,382,000 net tons in
1920 to 22,337,000 net tons in 1930. See 45T A Nx. Ra. I. C. C. (1931) 9S-99. That the
denials to railroads of Section 4 relief on the plea of water competition have aided ma-
terially this growth of water carriers cannot be doubted.
53. These reports are often long and poorly organized. Frequently, arguments of
interested parties are stated without an appraisal of their relative merits. Also, the con-
clusions of the commission are often scattered through statements of facts and of tefti-
mony. Thus, it frequently is impossible to isolate the ratio decedendi of a case. See, e. g.,
Wool Rates Investigation, 1923, 91 I. C. C. 235, 239-249 (1924).
54. Petroleum Products from New Orleans, 194 I. C. C. 31 (1933); Soap and Soap
Powders to the South, 194 I. C. C. 138 (1933), 196 I. C. C. 400 (1933); Cottonseed Oil
from Memphis, 208 I. C. C. 310 (1935); cf. Petroleum Products to Augusta, 213 L C. C.
759 (1936). But cf. Molasses and Sirup to Pittsburgh, 213 I. C. C. 794 (1936).
55. Newsprint Paper to Chicago, 194 I. C. C. 14S (1933); Sewage Sludge to Southern
Ports, 195 I. C. C. 311 (1933).
56. Gasolene to River Points in Alabama, 194 I. C. C. 79 (1933); Petroleum, New
Orleans Group to Mobile, 198 I. C. C. 359 (1934). And in a most interesting recent
case, railroads were granted Section 4 departures on Mondays, Thursdays, Fridays, and
Saturdays from Florida points to New England points in order to meet water competition
in the carriage of citrus fruits. Citrus Fruits from Florida, 211 I. C. C. 535 (1935).
57. See concuruing opinion of Commissioner Eastman in Petroleum Products from
New Orleans, 194 L C. C. 31 (1933), at 44-45.
58. Operative costs per net ton mile of rail carriers was 8.3 mills; of water car-lot car-
riers (common carriers transporting freight in less than car-lots and in car-lots), 6 mills;
of water cargo carriers (private or contract carriers transporting freight in cargo lots),
1.25 mills. Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Freight Traffic Report (1935) v. 1, p. 79.
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hibition against a lower charge for a longer than for a shorter haul were
removed. In competing with water carriers, however, the railroads have two sig-
nificant advantages, in that there are two types of traffic for which carriers by
water cannot effectively compete. The first consists of fragile or perishable goods
which cannot be moved conveniently by water; the second is that traffic which
moves to intermediate, inland points. Higher rates upon both types of non-com-
petitive traffic by rail in effect subsidize the railroads in their competition with
water carriers for that traffic which can be moved by both. Water carriers,
on the other hand, must meet the competition of the railroads at all points and
upon shipments of all types of goods. Because of these competitive advantages,
railroads were able to drive water carriers practically out of existence in the
last decades of the nineteenth century. Such a result is less probable today,
however, for truck and pipe-line competition has almost eliminated the class of
non-competitive traffic which was at one time "tied to the rails." Further,
Section 500 of the Transportation Act and the reasonably compensatory clause of
Section 4 probably would prevent the complete destruction of water transport
by rail competition. But, while rail carriers today cannot completely eliminate
common carriers by water, they do have the power to curtail substantially the
present movement of goods by water.
Although actual water competition has usually justified Section 4 departures
by competing railroads, there has been some question as to the effect of
potential water competition. The Commission early held that departures from
Section 4 were justified by railroads from Ohio river points to New Orleans
even though no regular service on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers had been
furnished for several years, on the theory that the existing rates had been
forced down by water competition and that the raising of rates to conform
to Section 4 would but cause the reestablishment of this water competition
which had formerly existed. 9 However, the Commission later abandoned this
holding, and refused to recognize potential water competition as a justification
for departures from Section 4.60 And as the 1920 amendment to Section 4,
reiterating the rule of these latter decisions, expressly prohibited relief on the
ground of potential water competition,01 the Commission since 1920 has
refused to permit Section 4 departures if actual compelling water competition
59. Fourth Section Violations in the Southeast, 30 I. C. C. 153, 185) 230, 263 (1914);
cf. In re Rates on Sugar, 31 I. C. C. 495, 506 (1914) ; Transcontinental Rates, 46 I. C. C,
236, 246 (1917).
60. Memphis-Southwestern Investigation, 55 I. C. C. 515, 565 (1919); Murfree-boro
Board of Trade v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 55 I. C. C. 648 (1919); Meridian Traffic
Bureau v. Director General, 57 I. C. C. 107 (1920); cf. In, re Reopening Fourth Section
Applications, 40 I. C. C. 35 (1916).
61. No authorization for departures from Section 4 "shall be granted on account of
merely potential water competition not actually in existence." 41 STAT. 480 (1920), 49 'U.
S. C. A. § 4 (1) (1926).
If there exists a waterway and adequate terminal facilities and a commodity well
adapted to wate'" transportation and a barge line which is ready and willing to carry
the traffic, actual water competition may be said to exist even though there has been no
actual movement by water. Rags and Paper to Newark, 208 I. C. C. 327 (1935).
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is not shown to exist. 62  Thus, since the Great Lakes and the Erie Canal
are closed to traffic in winter, Section 4 departures by competing railroads
because of such water competition are allowed only during the summer
months.
3
This statutory prohibition upon Section 4 relief because of potential water
competition undoubtedly was designed to foster the development of water
craft, a policy made explicit in Section 500 of the Transportation Act. For
if railroads were permitted to depart from Section 4 at all points at which
it was proposed to establish water service, only with the greatest difficulty
could water service ever be established. Only by means of the protection
of normal rail rates during the period of establishing regular service can water
carriers obtain a foothold in the transportation of goods.
Whether this policy of protecting the development of the waterways is more
desirable from the standpoint of the country at large than the conflicting policy
of reducing the ranks of water carriers through railroad long-and-short-haul
discriminations is a question impossible of definite answer. But since each
Section 4 rail departure because of water competition is designed to increase
the revenue of rail carriers at the expense of the water carriers, the wisdom
of such departures depends upon the relative benefits obtained on the one
hand from a prosperous rail system and on the other from a prosperous
system of water carriers.
As the private investment in railroads greatly exceeds that invested in
water carriers, 4 it might seem better to protect this greater investment at
the expense of the smaller one. Also railroads pay much heavier taxes to
the government than do water carriers. 3 Further, railroads employ more
62. Sugar from Key West, 112 I. C. C. 347 (1926); Rates from Eastern Territory, 143
I. C. C. 323 (192S).
63. Crude Sulphur to Erie, 200 I. C. C. 385 (1934); Newsprint Paper from Jonquiere,
201 I. C. C. 6S6 (1934).
64. Using "book cost" (without depreciation) as the equivalent of investment, and
apportioning investment upon an expense basis, the capital invested in freight facilities in
1932 was about 20 billion dollars, of which 18 billion were rail, three quarter billion pip2-
line, and one half billion water carriers. In addition, there were approximately two billion
dollars invested in motor trucks, an unknown part of which was devoted to intercity
transportation of freight. Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Freight Traffic Report
(1935) v. 1, p. 78.
65. The total taxes paid by Class I steam railroads in 1933 were $249,539,965 and in
1934 were $239,498,394. 4Sri ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1934) 102, 49TH A,:. REP. I. C. C.
(1935) 120. As water carriers are not subject to complete governmental regulation, similar
figures for them are not obtainable. However, since their investment is much less than
that of railroads, obviously their total tax is much less.
In addition to the total tax, there may be compared the percentage of revenue used in
paying taxes. A report prepared by the Association of American Railroads indicates that
in 1933 tailroads paid taxes amounting to 8.1 cents out of each gross dollar of revenue
while the 116 water carriers reporting to the Interstate Commerce Commison paid only
1-56 cents of each gross revenue dollar as taxes. See Hearing before Commi.ttee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 3263, H. .. 3610, H. R. 5362, and H. R. 8364, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 1019.
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labor.60 The country in time of war requires an efficient system of rail lines.
And finally, if railroads are permitted to compete freely with waterways
through Section 4 departures, it seems that the intermediate points are not
prejudiced by their rate relationships to the terminal ports for such ports
already have the advantage of lower rates by water. Yet the public has placed
large sums in the improvement of waterways, 7 and consequently has a direct
interest in their use. And the expense of heavy taxes and labor costs
ultimately is borne by the shippers who must pay for the increased cost of
transportation by rail over that by water. Water carriers are necessary, not
only to provide a merchant marine for world trade but also as an alternate
means of transportation in case of temporary disability of rail facilities and
as an aid to national defense in time of war. And the intermediate points
may in fact suffer a real prejudice by railroad Section 4 departures. For
the departure will give the terminal port an alternate route available for the
movement of goods and thus a wider choice of markets, and, through the
competition of such routes, somewhat better service and slightly lower rates.
Also, as certain articles are not adapted to movement by water, the terminal
port through blanket Section 4 rail departures obtains the benefit of a low
rail rate on these non-competitive articles which probably would move by rail
even if no departure were in effect. In brief, there is no "proper" course
to follow in the formulation of a policy of Section 4 departures because of
water competition. Rather, the choice or compromise to be effected involves
the adjustment of many conflicting interests articulated with varying degrees
of vigor and persuasiveness.
B. Pipe-Lines
In addition to the competition of water carriers, railroads have for many
years been forced to contend with the competition of pipe-lines,08 which to a
large degree have taken oil and oil products from the rails., Although pipe-
66. The average number of employees of Class I steam railroads during 1933 was
971,196 and in 1934 was 1,007,702. 49T"H AN,. REP. I. C. C. (1935) 114. Similar statisticq
for water carriers have not been discovered.
67. Up to June 30, 1932, the United States had spent, for the cost of new work and
for the cost of maintenance, for improving, extending and maintaining navigation by Inkes,
rivets and canals, $864,620,237. The sums that have been allocated and appropriated since
1932 for work upon inland waterways greatly increase the amounts spent up to that
time. JOHNSON, HuENER AND HENRY, TRANSPORTATION nY WATER (1935) 547-548.
68. In 1926, there existed in the United States 90,170 miles of trunk and gathering oil
pipe lines, while by 1931 this figure had reached 111,660, an increase of 24%. U. S.
Bureau of Mines, Survey of Oil Pipe Line Mileage, May 3, 1932.
There also is developing the movement of gasolene by pipe line. In a communication
from the Petroleum Economics Division of the Bureau of Mines to the Ytu.a LAW JouRNAL,
May 20, 1936, it was stated: "The first gasolene pipe-line was placed in operation in the
last half of 1930; at the present time the total mileage of gasolene lines operated is
4,329.7 miles."
69. In March, 1936, there were delivered to refineries 87,594,000 barrels of domestic
crude oil. Of this amount, pipe lines delivered 65,231,000 barrels, tank cars and trucks
2,240,000 barrels, and boats 20,123,000 barrels. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Crude Petroleum
Report by Refineries, Rep. No. A-943-30, May 15, 1936.
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lines are subject in part to the jurisdiction of the Commission,70 few complaints
have arisen concerning them, and there has been practically no occasion to
exercise this jurisdiction.71 In at least one case, however, in an effort to
enable railroads to regain some of this fluid traffic, the Commission has
allowed rail carriers to depart from Section 4 in the carriage of oil between
certain points on pipe-lines.72 To enhance further the revenues of the rail
lines, relief from Section 4 has even been granted on shipments of coal by
rail from Kentucky mines to Iowa to meet the competition of natural gas,
piped from the Oklahoma fields.73 Although the Commission in this case
expressly refused to hear the argument that unemployment conditions in the
coal industry required relief on the ground that it could consider only con-
ditions of transportation, nevertheless the granting of a departure in effect
alleviates the non-transportational factor of unemployment in bituminous coal.
The wisdom of permitting departures from Section 4 to enable the railroads
effectively to compete with pipe lines, as in the case of water transportation,
depends upon conflicting considerations of policy. Since under existing con-
Gasolene also is being taken from the Iails. In a communication from the Petroleum
Economics Division of the Bureau of Mines to the YAix LAw joupnM.A, May 20, 1936, it
was stated that "The development of motor fuel transportation by pipe-line has had an
appreciable effect on the movement by rail. For example, during March, 1936, total de-
liveries of motor fuel from lines amounted to 3,987,000 [barrels] or the equivalent of more
than 10 per cent of the indicated domestic demand for that period."
70. The Hepburn Act of 1906 subjected to regulation by the Interstate Commerce
Commission interstate common carrier pipe-lines "engaged in the transportation of oil or
other commodity, except water and except natural or artificial gas. . . " 34 SrxT. 584.
The constitutionality of this provision was sustained in the Pipe Lne Cases, 234 U. S. 548
(1914). This statutory provision was repeated in substantially the same form in the
Transportation Act, 1920. 41 STAT. 474, 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1) (b) (1926).
The act, however, does not apply to those interstate pipe-lines which carry only oil of
their own production. Pipe Line Cases, supra. And as about 50q of the trunk lines
owned by a group of large and medium sized oil companies carried no outside oil and only
10% carried in excess of 50% of outside oil [Report on Pipe Lines, H. R. REx. No. 2192,
72d Cong., 2d Ses. (1933) part 1, LXIII, 443-450], much of the oil moved by pipe-lines
is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
71. See 45TH ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1931) 113.
72. Petroleum and its Products, 133 I. C. C. 24 (1932).
73. Coal from Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky, 186 I. C. C. 697 (1932), 192 1. C. C.
586 (1933); cf. Coal and Coke to Mississippi Valley, 191 I. C. C. 589, 598-599 (1933), 204
I. C. C. 147 (1934).
Although the Commission in the first case to arise held that potential gas competition,
that is, intention by pipe-line companies to extend their lines along Lvith a solicitation of
contracts for the sale of gas, was insufficient to justify Section 4 relief [Coal from Illinois,
Indiana, and Kentucky, 186 L C. C. 697 (1932)], it later reversed this decision to hold
that such conditions did warrant relief. Coal from Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky, 192 1.
C. C. 586 (1933).
As pipe-lines carrying natural gas are not subject to regulation by the Commi.son, per-
haps these holdings indicate the long continued liberality in favor of regulated carriers as
against unregulated ones. For a discussion of attempts to regulate gas pipe-lines, see
Regulation of Transportation Agencies-Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation,
S-z. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 57.
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ditions there is not sufficient traffic to enable both railroads and pipe-lines
to secure adequate revenue from the traffic affected, the extent to which
Section 4 departures are allowed vitally influences the adjustment of that
revenue between the two competing agencies. In such adjustment the utility
to the nation of rail carriers as contrasted with pipe-lines, the respective needs
of the two types of carriers and of the industries and localities dependent
upon each, and the economy of operation of each are some of the factors
relevant to a well-considered Section 4 policy. Of these considerations, the
one which is the least speculative and on that account entitled to the greatest




While the inroads of the water carriers and pipe-lines have been serious,
in recent years the motor- truck7r has rapidly become the most dangerous
competitor of the railroads. 76  In efforts to stem the flow of traffic by motor
carrier, railroads often have voluntarily reduced their rates in certain areas
on those commodities as to which truck competition exists.71  Also, rail carriers
74. The operative cost per net ton mile of rail carriers in 1932 was 8.3 mills, while of
pipe-lines was but 3.2 mills. Such cost figures include maintenance of facilities and
overhead administration as well as the bare cost of movement of the goods. Federal Co-
ordinator of Transportation, Freight Traffic Report (1935) v. 1, p. 79.
75. In 1905, there were produced in the United States but 450 motor trucks. In 1919,
the annual production increased to 74,000 units, and by 1925 had reached 530,659. After
the peak of 767,499 in 1929, it dropped to 235,187 in 1932, but in 1934 had reached
575,192. WoRLDn A.irAAC (1936) 326.
The number of trucks in all classes of service increased from 85,600 in 1914 to 1,006,082
in 1920, 2,764,222 in 1926, and 3,480,939 in 1930. See Coordination of Motor Transporta-
tion, 182 I. C. C. 263, 274 (1932). In 1934, there were registered 3,409,335 freight motor
vehicles. WoaRD ALmamAC (1936) 327.
76. In terms of ton-miles, excluding that freight moving in the coast wise and inter
coastal trades, it is estimated that domestic freight was distributed as follows:
1929 1932
Steam Railroads 72.9 73.9
Great Lakes 15.8 7.8
Pipe lines (petroleum) 5.2 6.2
Intercity trucks 4.2 9.4
Inland waterways 1.4 2.5
Electric railways and airplanes 0.5 0.2
Regulation of Transportation Agencies-Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation,
SE. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934) 3.
Motor truck ton mileage was estimated to be 1.91 of railroad ton mileage in 1925 (gee
Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I. C. C. 685, 719 (1928)], yet in 1929 had
increased to 5.8% [see Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 402 (1932)],
and by 1932 had reached 12.7%. Regulation of Transportation Agencies, supra, at 18.
For a detailed analysis of this diversion of traffic from rail to truck, see Coordination
of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 283-309 (1932). Cf. Freight Traffic Report-
Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation (1935) v. 1, p. 17, 18, v. 2, pp. 44-43.
77. See Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 331-334 (1932). Such
rate cuts have been quite general in the case of cotton. Rate Structure Investigation, Part
3, Cotton, 165 I. C. C. 595 (1930), 174 I. C. C. 9 (1931), 176 I. C. C. 249 (1931).
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have entered the field of trucking itself, both by substituting truck for rail
service7s and by supplementing rail with truck service.70 And finally railroads
have sought departures from Section 4 in a further attempt to cope with
this competition of trucks.
Occasionally, railroads seek relief in order to meet the competition of trucks
for the carriage of a single commodity which is moving in comparatively
large quantities between two points. Such relief has been granted. 0  For
example, since there is a large movement of sugar from the entry port of
Baltimore to Hershey, Pennsylvania, a rail carrier sought and obtained per-
mission to lower its rate from Baltimore to Hershey in order to compete with
trucks for this traffic, yet was permitted to retain the existing normal rate level
to intermediate points 81 In such a case, as the commodity is certain to
move in any event at the low rate, the chief effect of Section 4 relief seems
to be to divert its movement from. truck to rail. Therefore, whether such
relief should be permitted would seem to depend largely upon the relative
public interest in the financial condition of the particular rail and truck
carriers engaged in such service. However, there is another consideration
involved. Since it is highly probable due to the flexibility of motor carrier
routes that the competition of trucks is approximately as effective at inter-
mediate points as at distant points, 2 these departures because of truck
competition are difficult to justify, for it is the volume of traffic for the long
haul available for division between rail and highway which determines the
railroads' petitions for Section 4 relief, rather than competition between the
two forms of transportation. Using the example above, railroads desire to
secure for themselves the relatively large amount of sugar moving to Hershey,
yet are notwilling to compete strenuously for the comparatively small amount
of sugar moving to points intermediate between Baltimore and Hershey. To
give one point a lower rate by rail than another merely because of its com-
mercial importance is to prefer that point unduly. Although such a practice
often has been condemned by the Commission,83 apparently it is tolerated in
78. See Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 336-33S (1932).
79. These include pick-up and delivery service, the less than carload container, and
the devices for line-haul movement of truck bodies. See Freight Traffic Report (1935) v. 2,
p. 187-230; Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 333-348 (1932).
80. Cement from Hudson, 186 I. C. C. 8 (1932); Petroleum from Portland, 183 I. C. C.
727 (1932); Petroleum Products to Wyoming Points, 211 I. C. C. log (1935); Sugar to
Fayetteville, 213 I. C. C. 723 (1936); cf. Canned Goods in Southwestem Territory, 203 I.
C. C. 497 (1935).
If a circuitous rail line seeks relief in order to meet the rates of a direct line which
have been lowered by truck competition, the equidistant clause does not apply. Scwcr
Pipe from Texarkana, 205 I. C. C. 279 (1934); d. Livestock in the Southwest, 203 L C.
C. 557 (1935). For an explanation of the equidistant clause, see infra p.
81. Sugar to He-shey, 200 I. C. C. 757 (1934).
82. See dissent of Commissioner Farrell in Cement from Hudson, 186 I. C. C. 8, at
15 (1932).
83. Fourth Section Order No. 8900, 88 I. C. C. 765, 769 (1924); Standard Paint Co. v.
Director General, 201 I. C. C. 792 (1934); cf. In re Rates on Salt, 24 I. C. C. 192 (1912);
Bowling Green Business Mlen v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 24 I. C. C. 228, 239 (1912).
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these instances of truck competition. To permit long-and-short-haul dis-
crimination in such cases where the competition of trucks appears even more
effective on the short haul than on the long is to discriminate against the
intermediate points and to disregard the limitation upon governmental regu-
lation of rates to the effect that transportation conditions alone may justify
action by the Commission.
84
There is another way in which railroads have sought to compete with trucks
by means of rate adjustments which do violence to the distance principle of
rate making. Since truck competition is most effective only for relatively
short distances, as, for example, from 50 to 150 miles, 85 the scheme has been
conceived of meeting this competition by lowering rates generally for these
short distances while retaining the other rates at the normal level. Thus,
if the normal rate on a given commodity were 35 for 100 miles and were
65 for 200 miles, the railroad might reduce the former rate to 30, leaving
the latter rate unchanged. Although this adjustment would enable railroads to
meet truck competition at short distances with low rates and yet to retain
more remunerative rates at the more distant points at which the truck
competition is not so keen, it is a plain violation of another clause of Section
4-the aggregate of intermediates clause, passed in 1910 and reenacted in
1920, which provides that "it shall be unlawful . . . to charge any greater
compensation as a through rate than the aggregate of the intermediate
rates. . ."86 Nevertheless, the Commission, exercising its power to grant
84. The Commission is said to have no power to equalize industrial conditions or to
offset economic advantages through adjustments of rates. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42 (1911); United States v. Illinois C. Rr. Co., 263 U.
S. 515 (1924); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627 (1933) ; Anchor Coal
Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928); Ashland Fire Brick Co. v.
Southern Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 115, 121 (1911); cf. ALLDREDo, op. cit. supra note 11, at 36;
MAiNSmLD, T=x LAXE CARGO CoAL RAT CONTROvMS (1932) 242-261.
The judicial nullification of the Hoch-Smith resolution, 43 STAT. 801 (1925), apparently
designed to empower the Commission to consider economic conditions at least in agricul-
ture, indicates the attitude of the courts toward deliberate economic planning. Ann Arbor
Rr. Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 658 (1930); see Robinson, The Hoch-Smith Resolution
and the Future of the Interstate Commerce Cominmissio (1929) 42 HtAv. L Ry. 610;
Mansfield, The Hoch-Smith Resolution and the Consideration of Commercial Conditions in
Rate-Fixing (1931) 16 CoRN. L. Q. 339.
85. The section of Transportation Service of the Federal Coordinator has but recently
completed an exhaustive factual study of freight traffic. In this study, there was developed
a mileage scale of truck costs for twenty-seven principal commodities. There was also
developed a synthetic rail mileage scale, depicting the level of average rail charges upon
important commodities as evidenced by the revenue received from them. Graphic com-
parisons of truck costs with this synthetic scale showed, for example, a point of inter-
section with anthracite coal at 40 miles, with lumber at 70 miles, with canned goods at
130 miles, and with potatoes at 200 miles. That is, at those respective distances or less
on each respective commodity, truck costs are less than present average rail charges.
Freight Traffic Report (1935) v. 1, p. 38-67.
86. 41 STAT. 480 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1) (1926). Thus, using the example In
the text, the through rate of 65 for 200 miles exceeds the sum of the reduced competitva
rate of 30 for 100 miles plus the same reduced rate of 30 for the second 100 miles. As
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relief in special cases,87 has in certain instances permitted rail carriers to
adjust their rates in this manner.5 8 Thus, since there exists a large movement
of cotton by truck to the port of Galveston, Texas from nearby inland Texas
points, railroads have been permitted to reduce rates from points in this
competitive zone to Galveston while maintaining the normal rate level from
more distant points.89
If rail carriers are to be permitted to meet the truck competitioa by means
of rate adjustments other than general rate reductions, this method which
concerns the aggregate of intermediates provision of Section 4 should be used
in preference to departures from the long and short haul provision of the
same Section. For in recognizing the uniformity of truck competition at short
distances and the comparative absence of it at longer distances, this system
is based upon competitive conditions in transportation and not upon the com-
mercial importance of localities. However, it is impossible to decide whether
such a method of competition is desirable, for it necessarily involves the
balancing of many interests. If trucks are permitted to carry all the traffic
which they can handle most economically, rail revenues necessarily will be
drastically reduced. 'While traffic moving by motor carrier will benefit from
the economy of this mode of transportation, the traffic "tied to the rails"
will be burdened by higher rates charged to offset the losses incurred by this
shift of traffic to trucks. Further, there must be considered the public in-
convenience and danger which arise from the prevalence of trucks on high-
ways.90 Railroads have a larger investment than trucks,6 4 pay more taxes,
and employ more men; but the trucks give a cheaper transportation service.
To permit Section 4 departures by rail carriers is to discourage the develop-
ment of competing motor carriers and perhaps even diminish their numbers;
to prohibit such departures is to further the growth of the trucking industry.
The choice between these two policies or the manner in which they are com-
promised will depend upon the persuasive articulation of the conflicting inter-
ests of rail carriers and motor carriers and of the industries and localities
dependent upon each of those two competing modes of transportation.
D. Rail Competition
In addition to the competition of water carriers, trucks, and pipe-lines for
the carriage of goods between terminal points, there 'also exists competition
illustrated, it is the depressed competitive rate of 30 rather than the normal rate of 35
which is to be used in determining whether there exists a violation of this clause. Cf.
Spartanburg Chamber of Commerce v. Southern Ry. Co., 34 I. C. C. 4S4, 494 (1915).
Almost no cases have arisen under this clause, seemingly because the railroads rarely
violate it and do not defend the violations which do occur. But with the growth of
truck competition, this clause is apt to become increasingly important.
87. Patterson v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 269 U. S. 1 (1925).
88. Rate Structure Investigation, Part 3, Cotton, 174 I. C. C. 9 (1931); Refined
Petroleum Products in the Southwest, 174 I. C. C. 745 (1931); Automobiles and Parts to
Louisiana and Arkansas, 211 I. C. C. 323 (1935); cf. Gasolene and Kerosene from No*folh,
214 I. C. C. 15 (1936). But d. Commodity Rates in Official Territory, 209 L C. C. 702
(1935).
89. Rate Structure Investigation, Part 3, Cotton, 174 I. C. C. 9 (1931).
90. See Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 355 (1932).
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between the rail carriers themselves. It was the discrimination arising out
of this competition in the era of rapid railroad expansion that led to the first
Act of 1887, and even today this competition is the most pregnant justification
of Section 4 departures. However, Were all such competition sufficient to
permit Section 4 departures by the railroads at all the points of competition,
the amended acts of 1910 and 1920 would be rendered as ineffective to check
long-and-short-haul discrimination as was the original act after the Alabama
Midland decision. Consequently, the Commission has uniformly held that the
most direct rail line between the two competitive points must conform strictly
to Section 4.91 Yet, if all rail lines between the two points were required
to conform to Section 4, the more indirect lines would suffer a loss of revenue.
For, on the one hand, if an indirect line did not meet the rate of the direct
line at the distant point, it would lose its share of the competitive traffic,
and on the other, if the indirect line attempted to compete with the direct
line for the traffic between the terminal points at which both lines -intersect,
compliance with Section 4 would require the reduction of rates to intermediate
points on the indirect line. Recognizing this situation and desiring to enable
indirect lines to share in traffic between competitive points, the Commission
since 1910 has held that indirect rail lines are privileged to meet the rate
of the direct rail line at the competitive point and to charge higher rates at
intermediate points.
0 2
The question naturally arises as to the degree of circuity which should
justify Section 4 departures by the indirect line. It would seem that the mere
difference in length of one mile between two competing routes should not
warrant a departure, since the longer road is not at a substantial competitive
disadvantage.93 And the Commission under the 1910 act held that Section 4
departures on the plea of circuity of route were justified only if the indirect
route were at least 157 longer than the direct route.94 Also, to permit a
91. Class and Commodity Rates from Louisville, 36 I. C. C. 317, 320 (1915); Rates
from New Orleans, 44 I. C. C. 727, 735 (1917); cf. Coal and Coke from Kentucky, 151 I.
C. C. 543, 549 (1929). Even if a circuitous line has a lower rate to the distant point than
does the direct line, the direct line may not depart from Section 4 to meet it. Coal
Briquettes from Kansas City, 186 I. C. C. 37 (1932).
92. In re Transportation of Wool, 23 I. C. C. 151, 179 (1912); McCullough v. Louis-
ville & N. Rr. Co., 25 I. C. C. 48 (1912); National Refrigerator & Butchers' Supply Co.
v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 26 I. C. C. 524 (1913).
Of course, the intermediate rates must be reasonable. Thomas Iron Co. v. Pennsylvania
Rr. Co., 28 I. C. C. 608 (1913); Standard Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 29 I. C. C. 524
(1914).
The circuitous route, however, is not required to meet the rate of the direct line. Grain
to Mississippi Valley, 107 I. C. C. 167 (1926). And since Section 4 orders are permLslve
and not mandatory, the circuitous route need not establish the lower rate to the longer
distance even after relief has been granted. Franklin Park Hay & Grain Co. v. Lehigh
& N. E. Rr. Co., 178 I. C. C. 363 (1931).
93. See Fourth Section Violations in the Southeast, 30 I. C. C. 153, at 304 (1914),
Cf. Rates from New Orleans, 44 I. C. C. 727, 736 (1917).
94. In re Rates on Salt, 24 I. C. C. 192 (1912); Edwards & Bradford Lumber Co. v,
Chicago, B. & Q. Rr. Co., 25 I. C. C. 93 (1912); Wiley & Morehouse v. Chicago, B. & Q.
Rr. Co., 42 I. C. C. 313 (1916). Thus, when the distance by the direct route was 352
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carrier operating a line several times as long as a direct line to share in
the transportation of goods between two points is to permit economic waste.
Consequently, the Commission also held that lines which were more than
150% circuitous could not depart from Section 4 in order to compete with
the direct line.95
The 1920 amendment to Section 4 expressed the legislative mandate that
no indirect route could compete for traffic unless its rates were reasonably
compensatory for the service performed.00 Since the Act contains no definition
of a reasonably compensatory rate, the Commission has so far been free to
impose any limitation upon rates in order to exclude those which it considers
are not reasonably compensatory. 7 TI'he most common limitation has been
the percentage-distance restrictions upon circuitous lines. Since 1920, the
Commission generally has retained its 15% rule,0° but has restricted somewhat
its maximum circuity limitations.0 9 However, in certain instances, the per-
centage-distance restrictions have been abandoned in favor of a limitation
based upon a certain percentage of the maximum reasonable rate between the
competitive points over the indirect route.100
All such restrictions are but attempts to arrive at a generalization which
miles and by the circuitous route was 397 miles, Section 4 relief was denied the indirect
route, the circuity being but 13%. Marshalltown Buggy Co. v. Wabash Rr. Co., 39 . C.
C. 633 (1916). However, occasional departures were sanctioned even though the circuitous
line was slightly less than 15% longer than the direct line. See, e. g., New Orleans Cotton
Exchange v. Louisville & N. Rx. Co., 46 I. C. C. 712, 753 (1917).
95. C. F. A. Class Scale Case, 46 I. C. C. 475 (1917); Cf. Sugar Rates from New
Orleans, 32 I. C. C. 606 (1915).
96. As the burden of proof is upon the carrier to justify compliance with this clause,
[Fourth Section Order No. 8900, 88 I. C. C. 765 (1924)] relief from Section 4 is denied when
this burden is not sustained. Cf. Transcontinental Eastbound Sugar, 186 1. C. C. 523, 534
(1932).
97. Class and Commodity Rates in the South, 191 I. C. C. 613, 617 (1933); cf. Perrine.
Armstrong Co. v. Pennsylvania Rx. Co., 169 I. C. C. 553, 555 (1930).
98. Goldsboro Chamber of Commerce v. Atlantic C. L. Rr. Co., 91 I. C. C. 315, 328
(1924); Plaster and Gypsum Products, 122 I. C. C. 747 (1927); see Fourth Section Order
No. 8900, 88 I. C. C. 765, 768 (1924).
99. Brick and Clay Products in the South, 88 I. C. C. 543, 564 (1924) (50%,'o circuity
permitted under reasonably compensatory restriction); Goldsboro Chamber of Commerce
v. Atlantic C. L. Rr. Co., 91 I. C. C. 315, 328 (1924) (70%). Since 70o circuity seemed
unreasonable on long hauls, the Commission soon adopted a standard which varied with
distance. Thus, although 70% remained the limit of circuity for direct line distances of
150 miles or less, no more than 50% was allowed for distances from 150 to ICOD miles,
and but 33 1-3% was permitted on greater distances. Iron and Steel Articles, 15S I. C. C.
517, 582 (1929); Paper to Springfield, 182 I. C. C. 611 1932); see Rates to Southern
Territory, 191 I. C. C. 507, 546 (1933).
100. The percentage figure which has been used varies from 60 to 75. Rates to
Southern Territory, 191 I. C. C. 507, 543-552 (1933) (60%, 75%); Class and Commodity
Rates in the South, 191 I. C. C. 613 (1933) (75o).
As circuity percentages are based upon distance alone while the percentage of a
maximum reasonable rate reflects not only the element of distance but also other elements
affecting the transportation charge, it seems that the latter is more adequate in approximat-
ing a reasonably compensatory rate.
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will indicate the limits of "reasonably compensatory" rates. Though all tests
yet devised may be criticized for their inaccuracies, 101 it is apparent that they
have in some degree eliminated wasteful competitive practices. As long as
carriers by rail continue to be regarded as independent competing entities,
some restriction upon their freedom to compete, such as the reasonably com-
pensatory clause, seems desirable.
In Section 4 as amended in 1920, there was included the equidistant clause,
which provides that "if a circuitous rail line or route is, because of such
circuity, granted authority to meet the charges of a more direct line or route
to or from competitive points and to maintain higher charges to or from
intermediate points on its line, the authority shall not include intermediate
points as to which the haul of the petitioning line or route is not longer
than that of the direct line or route between the competitive points, 10
Thus, assuming that AEC and ADBC are two competing railroads and that
distance ADB equals distance AEC, the circuitous road may charge more
upon traffic moving from A to any point between B and C than upon that
moving from A through B to C, but such authority to depart from Section 4
does not extend to traffic moving from A to any point on the circuitous road
between A and B.
The equidistant clause apparently was designed to prevent the railroad de-
parting from Section 4 from burdening the intermediate points on the indirect
line unduly by requiring that certain of the rates on the indirect line be
proportional to the rates on the direct line. Although this clause was
strictly enforced in the first cases to arise under it,103 several exceptions soon
developed.
101. See Transcontinental Cases of 1922, 74 I. C. C. 48, 72-80, 87-89 (1922) ; Class and
Commodity Rates from New Orleans, 98 I. C. C. 673 (1925); Commodity Rates to
Pacific Coast Terminals, 107 I. C. C. 421, 430-432 (1926).
For an excellent analysis of this problem, see DAziEas, op. cit. supr note 11, at 33-81.
See also note 50 supra.
102. 41 STAT. 480 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1) (1926). This clause not applicable
when a rail carrier seeks to compete with some other type of carrier, as, for example,
motor carriers. Sugar to Hershey, Pennsylvania, 200 I. C. C. 757 (1934).
103. South Bend Chamber of Commerce v. Director General, 61 I. C. C. 67 (1921);
Tribune v. Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co., 64 I. C. C. 557 (1921).
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First, if the indirect route was composed of two or more lines, the Commis-
sion held that the equidistant clause did not apply,10 since its application
would disrupt the existing differential arrangements on joint-line hauls, an
arrangement designed to take care of the extra cost of interchanging traffic
from one line to another on the joint-line route00° Since this exception dis-
regards the express wording of the equidistant clause, it is justified only if
the administrative difficulty of adjusting such rates outweighs the slight
prejudice which undoubtedly results to the intermediate points on the indirect
lines.'0 6 And if it be assumed that the indirect joint line could not meet
the direct rate were the equidistant clause imposed, then this holding of the
Commission seems to foster uneconomical transportation.
0 7
Second, the equidistant clause does not apply to adjustments of group rates.
It is the practice in freight rate making to select certain points which are
geographically adjacent to each other, and to give each of these points the
same rate either from a single point of origin or to a similar aggregation of
points located some distance away. Such rate making units are called groups;
and are established sometimes to simplify tariff lists and sometimes to equalize
competitive conditions among the various points comprising a group. An
indirect railroad running from a point of origin to a distant point located
in one group may pass through one or more points which are located in
another group. Should the latter group bear a higher rate from the point
of origin than does the former group, a departure from Section 4 would
result if the traffic is carried by the circuitous railroad at the lower rate.
And since this departure exists because the railroad is circuitous, it would
seem that the equidistant clause should apply. Yet were this clause applied,
the equality of rates of the points in the latter group might be destroyed,
and the group arrangement would thus be broken.' 08
104. Memphis-Southwestern Investigation, 77 I. C. C. 473, 523 (1923); Vinegar to
Texas Points, 98 I. C. C. 688 (1925); Agricultural Limestone from Waukesba, 185 I. C.
C. 615 (1932).
105. The Commission often has provided that a route composed of two or more
separately owned and operated rail carriers may charge a little more for a given move-
ment of goods than may a single carrier. Such a route is called a joint-line route; the
extra charge is the differential. See Memphis-Southwestern Investigation, 77 L C. C. 473,
592-595 (1923).
106. Using the figure in the text, supra p. 1448, if the rate from A to C through E is
40, then under the equidistant clause the rate to B cannot exceed 40. Yet if the indirect
route were composed of two or more carriers, there might exist a differential as, for ex-
ample, 3. Hence, if the equidistant clause did not apply, the indirect route would be
justified in charging 43 to B, while if the equidistant clause were applied, the rate could
not exceed 40. Thus it is seen that this exception to the equidistant clause, by permitting
a slightly higher rate to be charged to points such as B, causes some prejudice to such
points.
107. See dissent of Commissioner Campbell in Memphis-Southwestern Investigation, 77
I. C. C. 473, at 582 (1923).
108. Using the figure supra p. 1448, suppose that A is the point of origin and that D is a
point in a group which has a rate of 20 from A, while C is a point in a group which has
a rate of 15 from A. If the line ADBC is to share in the movement of goods from A to C,
it must carry them at the rate of 15, while if the group adjustment is maintained, this
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Since group rates are based upon average distances while the equidistant
clause is based upon actual point to point distance, the two cannot be har-
monized. One solution is to refuse to permit these circuitous lines which pass
through higher rated groups to haul such traffic at the low rate; another
is to allow such hauls subject to the equidistant clause, which in effect is an
abandonment of the group system of rates; and a third is to ignore the
equidistant clause.
While group rates simplify tariff lists and tend to equalize competitive con-
ditions, they favor some points and prejudice others. Competition is fostered
if circuitous lines can share in traffic, but economic waste also is encouraged.
Most authorities consider the distance principle of rate making upon which
the equidistant clause is based theoretically desirable but actually imprac-
ticable. 1 Although the Commission has vacillated in its views upon the
application of the equidistant clause to group rates, 0 D in its latest decisions
it has held that the public needs are best served if the clause is not applied
to this situation.1 0
Third, if an indirect interstate route seeks relief in order to meet the
competition of a more direct intrastate route,"" the equidistant clause has
been held not to apply." 2  This apparently is a reiteration of the old policy
of the Commission under the Act of 1887 to give carriers subject to the Act
line must charge 20 from A to D. Yet the application of the equidistant clause prohibits
a higher rate than 15 from A to D. Thus, if the clause is applied, D obtains a rate of 15
while other points in its group pay 20; and thus the equality of rates within the group is
destroyed.
109. In the early decisions, the equidistant clause was held not to apply. Class and
Commodity Rates between Western Points, 104 I. C. C. 578, 586 (1925); Class and Com-
modity Rates to Eastern Territories, 144 I. C. C. 28 (1928). But cf. Class and Com-
modity Rates from Pennsylvania, 115 I. C. C. 331 (1926). Yet in 1929, the Commission,
reversing its former holdings, held that the clause had to be applied. Commodity Rates
on Lumber, 151 I. C. C. 763. However, this holding was reversed the following year.
See infra note 110.
110. Commodity Rates on Lumber, 165 I. C. C. 561 (1930); Cement in Trunk Line
Territory, 174 I. C. C. 224 (1931); Scrap Non Ferrous Metals, 213 I. C. C. 399 (1935).
Of course, if the groups are unduly large or in any other manner are unduly preferential
to certain localities, they cannot be maintained. Lumber from the South and Southwest,
198 I. C. C. 753, 773-774 (1934).
111. The Transportation Act gives the Commission power to change intrastate rates
which discriminate against interstate transpoftation and provides for active cooperation
between the Commissions and the various State regulatory bodies on matters concerning
intrastate rates. 41 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 13(4), 13(3) (1926). See Pr.ny,
FEDEmmL INmRAsTATa RALROAD RATE REGULATioy (1926) 1-102; Lindahl, Cooperation Be.
tween the Interstate Commerce Commission and the State Commissions in Railroad Regula-
tion (1935) 33 MAcu. L. Rv. 338; Comment (1932) 17 IowA L. Rxv. 394; Comment
(1932) 80 U. of PA. L. REv. 1001; Comment (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 133.
112. Casinghead Gasolene between Texas Points, 192 I. C. C. 363 (1933); Fertilizer
Materials in Florida, 200 I. C. C. 790 (1934); Manure between Points in Florida, 214 I.
C. C. 20 (1936) Cf. Class and Commodity Rates in Texas, 190 I. C. C. 669 (1933); Live




greater freedom in competing with carriers not subject to the Act than with
other carriers subject to the Act.
Fourth, if the petitioning carrier is a short, financially weak line and the
purpose of the Section 4 relief is to increase its revenue, the equidistant clause
does not apply even though the weak line in fact is circuitous." 3 Here of
course the public interest in the solvency of a carrier is deemed to outweigh
the discrimination against the intermediate points on the weak line.
Fifth, the equidistant clause does not apply when departures are sought to
maintain territorial classifications on rates, even though the petitioning line
in fact is circuitous. 1 4  For example, because of operating conditions on the
west side of the Mississippi river, carriers there are granted higher scales of
rates than are carriers on the east side of the river.11: A west side carrier
competing with an east side carrier from Memphis to New Orleans must meet
the east side carrier's rate, yet is considered to deserve higher rates because
of higher operating costs. To impose the equidistant clause would reduce its
revenues. Here also the financial condition of a carrier is enhanced at the
expense of the intermediate points.
The Commission has used the device of the distance rate scale-a rate
system which has provoked much controversy-in applying the equidistant
clause to protect intermediate points on indirect lines which have departed
from Section 4. Whether distance scales should be imposed generally upon
railroad freight rates is another question impossible of categorical answer.
Though rate scales proportional to distance certainly seem theoretically desir-
able, they may well be impracticable in the present railroad system of rate
making,. Since there is widespread opposition to the adoption of this scale,
and since there have developed so many confusing exceptions to the present
equidistant clause, Coordinator Eastman's suggestion of repealing this clause
seems expedient." 6  The slight hardship which may result to intermediate
points on indirect lines probably is overbalanced by the increased simplicity
which will be introduced into questions of departures from Section 4 because
of rail competition.
Since the Transportation Act implicitly authorizes Section 4 departures
on circuitous lines, the Commission's orders permitting departures on such
lines can hardly be criticized. Whether an amendment to the statute elim-
inating circuity as a ground for relief is advisable depends upon the desir-
ability of competition between rail carriers. The advantages obtained from
such competition cannot be weighed neatly against the economic loss of waste-
ful transportation. As long as railroads remain independent operating units,
it is clear that some degree of competition should be permitted. As the
113. North Carolina Pine Ass'n v. Atlantic C. L. Rr. Co., 107 I. C. C. 190 (1926);
Mississippi Railroad Comison v. Alabama & V. Ry. Co., 120 I. C. C. 569 (1927);
Lumber from Fayette, 197 I. C. C. 418 (1933).
114. Mlemphis-Southwestern Investigation, 80 I. C. C. 157 (1923), 142 I. C. C. 139 (1928);
Livestock-Western District Rates, 194 I. C. C. 637 (1933); Iron and Stel Rates, 2G9 I.
C. C. 657, 666 (1935).
115. Memphis-Southwestern Investigation, So I. C. C. 157 (1923).
116. Regulation of Transportation Agencies-Report of Federal Coordinator of Trans-
portation, SF-. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 71.
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movement for the consolidation of railroads grows,117 however, competition
between them must decrease, and if unified government ownership is ever
reached,"18 the pressure for Section 4 departures because of circuity will be
considerably lessened.
E. Competition of Distributing Markets
Rail competition may affect rates in ways other than by the competition
between two or more railroads which run between the same two points,
justifying Section 4 departures when one line is circuitous. Suppose that
railroad A runs from New York to Macon, Georgia while railroad B runs
from New York to Atlanta, Georgia. Since Macon and Atlanta are large
cities not far apart in the same state, dealers in the two cities compete for
the business of distributing goods in the same territory. Carrier A is inter-
ested in maintaining low rates to Macon which will enlarge the distributing
capacity of that city, and hence will increase the flow of traffic to Macon,
while carrier B similarly is interested in increasing the movement of goods
to Atlanta. Although the direct competition is that of rival dealers in the
two distributing points for the business of the surrounding territory, yet, the
indirect competition is that of the rival carriers serving the respective dis-
tributing points.119
The Commission has generally held that such competition is not sufficient
cause for Section 4 relief, for the reason that the same conditions which are
offered in justification for the lower rates to the more distant point are also
present at the intermediate points, and that the latter are entitled to the same
117. Congress first directed the Commission to prepare and to adopt a plan for the
consolidation of railroads in the Transportation Act, 1920, 41 STAT. 481, 49 U. S. C. A. §§
5 (4), (5) (6) (1926), and reiterated this policy in the Emergency Railroad Transportation
Act, 1933. 48 STAT. 212, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 253-255 (1935).
It has been estimated that as much as $740,000,000, or 30% of the total railroad operating
expenses of 1932, could be saved by certain plans of consolidation. However, consolida-
tion to date has been opposed successfully both by railway labor and by railroad manage-
ment. See Is There a Need for a Radical Change in The Railroad Industry-Report of
Federal Coordinator of Transportation, SEN. Doo. No. 119, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 40-
55; cf. Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation on Transportation Legislation, 1.
R. Doc. No. 89, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) v. 1, pp. 69-75; Report of Federal Coordina-
tor of Transportation on Economy Possibilities of Regional Coordination Projects, Feb. 14,
1935; Second Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation on Economy Possiblltt0e
of Regional Coordination Projects, July 12, 1935; Simpson, The Interstate Commerce Com.
mission and Railroad Consolidation (1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 192; Comment (1931) 31
CoL. L. REy. 651.
118. Ever since the war-time period of government control over railroads, government
ownership has often been suggested. See Dunn, The Plumb Plan for the Control of the
Railroads (1920) 90 Cent. L. J. 3; Fowler, Federal Power to Own Railroads in Peacetime
(1920) 33 HARv. L. REV. 775. See also reports cited in note 117 supra.
119. The competing carriers need not both be railroads. Thus, Chicago distributors of
canned goods moving from the Pacific coast by rail may be in competition with New York
distributors who have obtained their canned goods from the Pacific coast by water.
Canned Goods from Pacific Coast, 132 I. C. C. 520, 527-528 (1927).
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opportunity as the more distant points to meet those conditions.1
-0 If relief
were granted because of the competition between distributing centers, in effect
there would be revived the old basing point system, so long prevalent in
the south, under which the larger communities were usually preferred at the
expense of the smaller.' 2 ' The refusal of the Commission to permit Section 4
departures on the ground of competition between cities for the distribution
of goods is consistent with its policy of denying Section 4 relief because of
the commercial importance of a terminal point,8a and with the limitation upon
its authority that it may consider only transportation conditions
s 4
F. Production Market Competition
Another type of indirect competition which railroads often have proposed
as a basis for relief from Section 4 is the competition of markets of produc-
tion. Such competition can best be illustrated by the following example.
Chicago plaster distributors may buy plaster either from manufacturers in
Grand Rapids, Michigan or in Fort Dodge, Iowa. ' These two cities, com-
peting for the trade in plaster to Chicago, may be said to be competing
markets of production. Since Grand Rapids is closer to Chicago than Fort
Dodge, Grand Rapids plaster ordinarily can move to Chicago at a lower rate
than can Fort Dodge plaster. Thus the Grand Rapids manufacturer will be
able to undersell his Fort Dodge competitor unless the latter can obtain an
equally low rate to Chicago. If the Fort Dodge manufacturer is permitted
to compete in the Chicago market, by allowing rail carriers from Fort Dodge
through Section 4 departures to meet the rate from Grand Rapids, he will
obtain some trade which the Grand Rapids producer would otherwise have
had. On the other hand, if a Section 4 departure is denied, Grand Rapids,
by getting the Chicago trade, will tend to prosper while Fort Dodge will suffer
correspondingly.
Upon no problem under Section 4 is there more confusion and contradiction
than upon that of the effect of this competition of producing markets upon
rail rates. The many decisions of the Commission upon this point are in
such hopeless conflict that accurate generalizations are impossible. When
production market competition has been pleaded as a cause for Section 4
120. Fourth Section Violations in the Southeast, 30 I. C. C. 153, 263-266, 277, 279
(1914); Cullman Commercial Club v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 33 L C. C. 634 (1915);
Mlemphis-Southwestern Investigation, 77 I. C. C. 473, 520 (1923). But cf. Bluefield Shipp-as
Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 519 (1912); Rates on Bituminous Coal, 36 I.
C. C. 401, 418 (1915); Canned Goods from Pacific Coast, 132 I. C. C. 520 (1927).
121. See AMiLE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 564-578; RIPLEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at
238-243; cf. Board of Trade of Carrollton v. Central of G. Ry. Co., 28 I. C. C. 154 (1913).
122. See Grand Rapids Plaster Co. v. Lake S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 41 I. C. C. 1, 7 (1916).
n this case, both competing carriers happen to be railroads. However, any type of
transportation agency may be a competing carrier. For example, producers in the
Chicago area who reach the west-coast by rail are continually in competition for the vwet-
coast trade with producers in the New York City area who reach the west-coast by water.
See Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co., 21 L C. C. 329, 347-365 (1911);
City of Spokane v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. 400, 422 (1911).
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relief and has been denied, the Commission often gives no reason at all for
its holding.1' Yet sometimes relief is refused on the ground that the pro-
ducing point from which the departure is asked already had "a very sub-
stantial sale" in the common market,1 24 or that the higher rates to the
intermediate points were not proved to be reasonable,'12 or that uneconomic
transportation would result,1 26 or that long standing rate adjustments would
be disrupted,1 2 7 or that certain manufacturers would be given a preference
or advantage which would not be "natural,"'128 or that the proposed rates
were not reasonably compensatory,1 29 or that the competing carrier would be
injured, 30 or that intermediate points would be prejudiced.' 31 Also, relief
has been denied on the ground that it might prove a "double-edged sword,"
in that were relief granted to one carrier at one point of competition then a
competing carrier might with equal reason seek and receive relief at other
points of competition.'
32
And when relief from the long-and-short-haul clause has been granted
because of production market competition, it is difficult to determine exactly
what factors have prompted the Commission to arrive at its result.133  De-
123. Coffee from Galveston, 64 1. C. C. 26 (1921); Iron and Steel Articles from the
South, 198 I. C. C. 417 (1934) ; Stoves and Ranges to Southern Border Points, 200 I. C. C.
389 (1934) ; Electric Irons from Leeds, 211 I. C. C. 129 (1935); cf. Lumber from California,
80 I. C. C. 595 (1923); Rates on Sugar, 95 I. C. C. 151 (1924); Paving Brick to Florida,
120 I. C. C. 469 (1927); Fourth Section Departures on Salt, 123 I. C. C. 73 (1927);
Coal and Coke from Oklahoma, 153 I. C. C. 409 (1929); Machinery and Machines from
the South, 213 1. C. C. 189 (1935).
124. Paper to Southwestern Points, 78 I. C. C. 600 (1923); cf. Sugar Cases of 1922, 81
I. C. C. 448, 461 (1923).
125. In re Lumber Rates, 25 I. C. C. 50, 59 (1912); Pacific Coast Foutth Section Ap-
plications, 129 I. C. C. 3, 23 (1927); cf. Railroad Commissioners of Kansas v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 407, 419 (1912).
126. Iron and Steel to Texas Ports, 206 I. C. C. 249 (1935); cf. Coal and Coke from
Kentucky, 151 I. C. C. 543, 549 (1929).
127. Bituminous Coal to Buffalo, 194 I. C. C. 11 (1933).
128. Commodity Rates to Pacific Coast Terminals, 107 I. C. C. 421, 436 (1926); cf.
Iron and Steel to Texas Ports, 206 I. C. C. 249 (1935).
129. Wrought-Iron Pipe and Iron Pipe Fittings, 81 I. C. C. 691 (1923); cf. Green Coffee
From Texas Pots, 198 I. C. C. 421 (1934).
130. Commodity Rates to Pacific Coast Terminals, 107 I. C. C. 421, 439 (1926).
131. Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Michigan C. Rr. Co., 24 I. C. C. 604 (1912).
Cf. Commodity Rates to Pacific Coast Terminals, 107 I. C. C. 421, 437 (1926); Iron and
Steel to Texas Ports, 206 I. C. C. 249 (1935).
132. Paper to Southwestern Points, 78 I. C. C. 600 (1923); cf. In re Rates on Salt,
24 I. C. C. 192 (1912).
133. Cf. Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern P. Co., 21 I. C. C. 329, 367-
370 (1911); In re Rates on Tropical Fruits, 30 I. C. C. 621, 631 (1914); Fourth Section
Violations in Rates on Sugar, 31 I. C. C. 511, 527-531 (1914); Corporation Commission of
New Mexico v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 34 I. C. C. 292, 301 (1915); Rates on
Bituminous Coal, 36 I. C. C. 401, 407, 413 (1915); Grand Rapids Plaster Co. v. Lake S. &
M. S. Ry. Co., 41 I. C. C. 1 (1916); Iron and Steel in the South, 201 I. C C. 92 (1934);
Sugar from Atlantic Seaboard Territory, 204 I. C. C. 253 (1934).
The Commission has imposed two conditions which must be satisfied before such
partures have been justified on the ground that the consuming market will
benefit by a second source of supply,134 or that the carriers need the addi-
tional traffic,135 or that the general welfare of the producers and the com-
munities which they represent requires relief, 30 or that a certain rate parity
must be restored.'
7
While the Commission often states that the size or commercial importance
of one point is not in itself sufficient reason for permitting Section 4 departures
upon traffic moving to it,83 granting relief because of production market
competition inevitably tends to prefer the larger communities at the expense
of the smaller. Although every producing locality in the United States is
subject to the competition of various centers of production, relief from Section
4 on this ground is sought only at the more important points1 3 s In this
phase of its work the Commission is furthest from purely transportational
issues and closest to regional planning. The confusion of the Commission's
opinions on these departures is the inevitable result of using a vocabulary of
transportation to express decisions on issues of economic policy and on dashes
of economic interest.
G. Short and Weak Lines
Section 4 relief has regularly been granted to certain short financially weak
lines, located mainly in the southeastern part of the United States, which
are in desperate financial straits because of their high operating costs and
their location in sparsely settled country.139 It is obvious that relief because
competition may justify Section 4 relief. The petitioning carrier must be under a material
disadvantage because of having a longer route, and must meet consistently at all inter-
mediate points the competition against which relief is sought. Fourth Section Violations
in the Southeast, 30 I. C. C. 153, 279 (1914); Proportional Rates to Ohio River Cro:-eings,
43 I. C. C. 458, 463 (1917); cf. Fourth Section Violations in Rates on Sugar, 31 I. C. C.
511 (1914).
134. City of Spokane v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. 400, 423 (1911); Rates to
Gray's Harbor, 88 I. C. C. 512 (1924).
135. leats and Packing House Products, 136 I. C. C. 651, 663-665 (1923); cf. Canned
Goods from Pacific Coast, 132 I. C. C. 520, 524 (1927); Coal to Cincinnati, 197 I. C. C.
53 (1933), 210 I. C. C. 447 (1935).
136. Meats and Packing House Products, 136 I. C. C. 651, 670 (1928); Sugar Cares
of 1933, 195 I. C. C. 127, 161 (1933); Canned Goods from Colorado, 209 I. C. C. 507
(1935); cf. Graham & Gila County Traffic Ass'n v. Arizona E. Rr. Co., 40 I. C. C.
573, 576, 588 (1916).
137. Sugar Cases of 1933, 195 I. C. C. 127, 157 (1933); Coal to St. Louis District,
193 1. C. C. 603 (1934); cf. Coal and Coke to Mississippi Valley, 191 I. C. C. 589,
592 (1933); Cement to Chicago and St. Louis, 191 I. C. C. 699 (1933).
138. See dissent of Commissioner Eastman in Paper and Paper Articles to New
Orleans, 88 I. C. C. 345, at 353 (1924).
139. Murfreesboro Board of Trade v. Louisville & N. Rr. Co., 73 1. C. C. 228 (1922);
Owensboro Chamber of Commerce v. Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co., 81 1. C. C. 145,
151 (1923); Rates from, to, and between Points in Southern Territory, 191 I. C. C. 507,
514 (1933); Gasolene from Norfolk, 214 I. C. C. 15 (1936). Cf. North Carolina Pine
Ass'n v. Atlantic C. L. Rr. Co., 85 L C. C. 270, 292 (1923); Rates from Eatern Territory




of financial condition is granted because the public interest in having the
carrier continue to operate is deemed to outweigh the burden of discriminatory
rates upon intermediate points. -However, since Congress expressly provided
for relief to weak railroads in the recapture clause,140 it is questionable whether
the Act was intended to permit Section 4 departures on this ground of
financial condition. 14 1  Of course, since the recapture clause has been re-
pealed,'142 the weak lines now must either get relief from Section 4 or
be reorganized, or abandoned. Although a vigorous policy of abandoning
roads would bring with it new problems, it may seem better to abandon these
roads than to continue to require the intermediate points on such lines to
support them, especially since the transportation demands of such points prob-
ably could be adequately satisfied by trucks.
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H. Rate Classifications
As indicated in the discussion of the equidistant clause, departures from
Section 4 have been granted in order to maintain certain territorial rate
classifications. American freight rates are models of confusing intricacies,
involving many classifications of commodities, of whole sections of the country
into territories, and of certain points as common producing and distributing
groups. A rate territory normally comprises thousands of square miles and
is designed to give a region of the country the advantage of a uniform
internal rate level. A group, on the other hand, is a small basing point area
about 25 or 50 miles in diameter, from which all rates to a given external
point are the same. Often Section 4 departures are requested to permit
certain railroads to compete for the carriage of goods without disturbing these
inflexible freight rate structures. Departures have been permitted when a
route between two competitive points passes through one rate territory while
a competing carrier traverses a lower rated territory.144  The system of group
rates has led to a similar type of departure. Where group rates have been
established and the most direct line passes through a higher rated group,
Section 4 relief must be granted to the direct line if the group arrangement
is to be maintained.
1 45
Whether such departures should be permitted depends upon the utility of
the existing system of freight rate making. While the present system appears
arbitrary in some particulars, the convenience of its administration might more
than outweigh the objection that freight rates are not fair at every point.
140. 41 STAT. 488-491 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15a (1926).
141. See dissent of Commissioner Campbell in Cotton via Elberton & E. Rr., 81
I. C. C. C. 261, at 265 (1923).
142. 48 STAT. 220 (1933), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15b (1935).
143. See Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I. C. C. 685, 718 (1928).
144. Memphis-Southwestern Investigation, 80 I. C. C. 157 (1923), 142 I. C. C. 139
(1928); Livestock-Western District Rates, 194 I. C. C. 637 (1933); Iron and Steel Rates,
209 I. C. C. 657, 665, 674 (1935); Binder Twine from New Orleans, 214 I. C. C. 126
(1936).
145. Cement in Trunk-Line Territory, 174 I. C. C. 224 (1931); Livestock in Official
Territory, 186 I. C. C. 457 (1932); Sulphate of Ammonia to the South, 191 1, C. C. 227
(1933); cf. In re Lumber Rates, 25 I. C. C. 50, 51 (1912).
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COMMENTS
Whether the system is cumbersome and antiquated or sufficiently effective to
justify Section 4 departures for its preservation is an issue which must await
careful research by the Commission.
I. Exceptional Relief
The Commission has also recognized certain exceptional and urgent needs
for temporary relief from Section 4. Thus, carriers by rail may transport at
very low rates food and other necessaries of life to localities suffering from
drought or floods or famine without reducing its intermediate rates.'4 0 Also,
if there is a washout or wreck or other emergency of a similar nature, then
Sectipn 4 may be disregarded and traffic may move over the most economical
and expeditious route available.'
47
ALTERNATIVES TO SECTION FoujR
The continual struggle of rail carriers for traffic against the competition
of trucks, watee carriers,'1 48 pipe-lines, 149 and even other rail carriers, and the
strenuous efforts of competing producers and distributors to gain advantageous
freight rates are reflected in the countless Section 4 orders of the Commission
in which an attempt has been made to compromise these conflicts. In view
of the vitality of these dashes of interest, which are fought out along poli-
tical as well as economic lines, it is not surprising that much dissatisfaction
has been expressed with the existing scheme of long-and-short-haul rate
regulation.' 5°
The future of long-and-short-haul rate regulation is not easy to prescribe
or to predict. The path of least resistance would be to retain the existing
law, perhaps with minor modifications, such as the repeal of the equidistant
clause.151 This policy of prohibiting a greater charge for a shorter haul,
146. See Administration of Fourth Section, 87 I. C. C. 564, 568 (1924); Commodity
Rates on Lumber, 165 L C. C. 561, 565 (1930); cf. Application of Fremont, E. & 31.
V. Rr. Co., 6 I. C. C. 293 (1895).
147. Shipments Forwarded via Unusual Routes, 167 I. C. C. 249 (1930).
148. Besides the independent competition of water lines and of trucks which has been
increasingly effective in Irecent years, there has of late arisen a new menace to rai
prosperity-the water-truck line, which may prove even more harmful to railroads. Sec-
tion 4 departures have been granted to enable rail calrriers to meet this nevi form of
competition. Citrus Fruits from Florida, 211 I. C. C. 535 (1935); Scrap Iron from
Cohoes, 214 I. C. C. 23 (1936); Coke to Portland District, 214 I. C. C. 32 (1936).
149. See infra p. 1440.
150. The blanket prohibition of long-and-short-haul discrimination, appearing even in
the first Act of 1887, seems to have been based upon the theory that railroads had a
substantial monopoly of transportation. As competing types of carriers have made in-
creasingly serious inroads into the business of the railroads, however, Section 4 policy
becomes more confused, and dissatisfaction with it increases.
151. See supra note 116. Coordinator Eastman also has suggested that the reasonably
compensatory and potential water competition clauses may be repealed, on the theory that
the confusion and controversy now existing as to the meaning of these clauses may thus
be avoided and yet the Commission can be trusted in administering such an amended
statute to follow the general policy enunciated by these clauses. See Regulation of
Transportation Agencies-Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Sru-. Doc.
19361
1458 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
while giving the Commission discretion to permit exceptions, vests in the
Commission a tremendous power to formulate a social policy for itself. The
fact that the existing regulation satisfies neither water lines15 2 nor railroads
might be some evidence that the Commission has avoided at least the more
obvious errors in its work of compromise.
While the railroads have continually objected to the restriction upon their
earning power which they feel Section 4 has imposed, their precarious financial
condition today increases their drive for more revenue and intensifies their
dissatisfaction with Section 4. Even under the existing status of long-and-
short-haul rate regulation, however, there are several methods other than
departures from or repeal of Section 4 whereby railroads might increase their
net revenues. Economies through more efficient management and operati6n, 163
abandonment of unprofitable spur lines, 54 consolidation of railroads,11 hori-
zontal increases in freight rates,lr 5 and, paradoxically, general reductions in
rates,156 have been proposed and to some extent adopted. The railroads,
No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 71-72. Such a Bill,. restoring Section 4 to its status
prior to the 1920 amendment, has been presented to Congress. H. R. 3362 (Rayburn-
Eastman Bill).
152. There have often been proposed before Congress Bills designed to eliminate en-
tirely or in part water competition as a ground for. Sectio 4 relief. See, o. g., S. 2327,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) (first Gooding Bill); S. 575, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926)
(second Gooding Bill); S. 563, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) (Pittman Bill). Such bills
have had little success. See DEwEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 221-224.
153. In an attempt to improve their financial position, the railroads in recent years
have engaged in strict economy programs, and have succeeded in cutting expenses to the
bone. Consequently, it is improbable if much more reduction of expense can be secured
in this manner. For a comprehensive discussion of current railroad financial problems,
see Comment (1935) 48 HAnv. L. REv. 1382.
154. In 1930 railroads sought to abandon 980 miles of track, while in 1935 this figure
had increased to 2,537. See 48Tn ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1934) 20; 49TH ANN. REP. I. C. C.
(1935) 23. The actual monetary savings resulting from such abandonment frequently
cannot be determined.
Abandonpaent has been rendered difficult because of the opposition of local communities
from which rail service would be removed [see San Antonio S. Ry. Co. Abandonment,
189 I. C. C. 114, 116-118 (1932)], and of labor interests, who caused restrictions upon
the reduction of railroad employment to be written into the Emergency Transportation
Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 214, 49 U. S. C. A. § 257 (b) (1935).
155. In 1931, the railroads applied to the Commission for a general increase of 15%
in freight rates. Although this blanket increase was denied, provision was made for
temporary surcha rges on specific products. Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, 178 I. C. C.
539 (1931).
In 1935, the carriers again petitioned for a general increase, this time only on those
products which they believed could bear the increase and still move by rail. Again,
although the Commission denied the general increase requested, it did grant a temporary
increase on certain products. Emergency Freight Charges, 1935, 208 1. C. C. 4 (1935).
156. In 1933, shippers petitioned the Commission for a general reduction In rail freight
rates. This was denied. General Rate Level Investigation, 1933, 195 1. C. C. 5 (1933).
However, railroads have voluntarily reduced thousands of rates to meet competition.
See General Rate Level Investigation, 1933, supra at pp. 47, 48, 70, 71; Comment (1935)
48 HAgv. L. RaV. 1382, 1397-1398. Whether the demand for commodities carried by rail
however, have not been satisfied with the results of these attempts to increase
their revenues, and consequently urge the repeal of Section 4 to enable them
more effectively to compete with unregulated carriers.
The Pettengill Bill, recently passed by the House of Representatives and
now pending before the Senate,15 7 is designed to aid the railroads by repealing
the long-and-short-haul clause of Section 4. Under this Bill, shippers at
intermediate points who complain of lower charges to more distant points may
obtain relief only if such rates violate other sections of the Transportation
Act.'15
It is impossible to predict accurately the effect upon the transportation
system of this Bill should it become law. While the discriminatory practices
so common between 1897 and 1910 might reappear, that result is improbable
in view of the changes since that time in business and in the machinery for
the administrative control of the railroad rate structure. Although the elim-
ination of the long-and-short-haul clause as a weapon of control might reduce
even the present effectiveness of the general scheme of railroad regulation, the
Commission now has the minimum and maximum rate making powers as
well as the power of suspension of rates-none of which existed under the
original Act.' 59 And moreover, there exists today much more competition in
the field of transportation. Pipe lines, water carriers, and trucks, which did
not threaten the existence of the railroads in that early period, today are
effectively competing for the carriage of goods. To what extent these changes
will prevent a return of the long-and-short-haul abuses at the turn of the
century is impossible to determine; but speculation is irresistible.
The repeal of Section 4 will enable railroads to meet water competition
is suffidently elastic so that a downward revision of freight rates will bring higher net
revenues is still a matter for speculation. The reduction in passenger fares to go into
effect this month may furnish useful data for freight traffic.
157. H. R. 3263, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). This Bill on March 24 passed the House of
Representatives by a vote of 215 to 41. See 80 Cong. Rec., Mlarch 24, 1936, at 4478.
Two days later, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce. See
so Cong. Rec., March 26, 1936, at 4533.
158. The Bill retains in Section 4 only the aggregate of intermediates clause with
provision for relief from it by the Commission "from time to time," and the clause
prohibiting rail rates depressed by water competition from being raised unless such pro-
posed increase rests upon changed conditions other than the elimination of water com-
petition. For a discussion of the latter clause, -ee supra note 33.
The Bill also provides that "in any case before the Commison where there is brought
in issue a lower rate or charge for the transportation of like kind of property, for a
longer than for a shorter distance over the same line or route in the same direction,
the shorter being included within the longer distance, the burden of proof shall ba upon
the carrier to justify the rate or charge for the longer distance against any claim of a
violation of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act."
159. The power to prescribe maximum rates was given to the Commicson in 1920.
41 STAT. 4S5, 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1) (1926). The Commission has had the maximum
rate making power since 1906. 34 STAT. 5S9, 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1) (1926). And
the power of suspension was conferred in 1910. 36 STAT. 552, 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (7)
(1926). Cf. Mansfield, The Minitmurn Rate Power and the Control of Carrier Competition
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1406.
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more effectively.16 ° As the Transportation Act prohibits railroads from meet-
ing potential water competition, water carriers are free to compete with rail-
roads for the carriage of goods, and rail carriers may not obtain Section 4
relief until such water competition has become quite real. Railroads also
must obtain permission of the Commission before carrying goods at reduced
rates to meet water competition, even after it has become well established.
The resulting delay enables water carriers to gain a strong foothold. And
as soon as the Commission has approved a departure because of water com-
petition, water carriers are free to lower their rates further, while the rail.
roads must appeal again to the Commission for permission to meet this new
water rate. While the Pettengill Bill will give railroads greater freedom in
meeting water competition, Section 500 of the Transportation Act purports
to protect the interests of the water carriers. It is probable, however, that
by the repeal of Section 4 the railroads will be able to take a sizeable portion
of that traffic now moving by water.
n 16
The repeal of Section 4 also will allow railroads to regain some of that
traffic which now moves by truck. Since motor carriers have but recently
been placed under the jurisdiction of the Commission, 10 2 it is unlikely that
railroads could or would be permitted to stifle truck competition completely.
More probable is some diversion from truck to rail of those goods now moving
on the highway.
In addition to shifting traffic from water carriers and trucks to railroads,
the repeal of Section 4 will effect a readjustment of traffic among rail carriers.
Unhampered by the prohibition against long-and-short-haul discrimination and
by the restriction of the reasonably compensatory clause, circuitous rail lines
would be able to take more traffic from direct rail lines between two points.
Market competition will cause long-and-short-haul discrimination without the
intervention of the Commission to pass upon the significance of that competi-
tion. This rate policy undoubtedly will alter further the flow of traffic among
railroads as they compete more vigorously for the carriage of goods from
competing producing points to competing points of distribution.
Although the chief justification for the abolition of Section 4 is that rail
revenues would thereby be increased, it is doubtful whether such an increase
actually would result. Since the added traffic is to be carried at reduced
competitive rates, it is possible that the net revenue of the railroads may
160. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Connmerce ot II. R.
3263, H. R. 3610, H. R. 5362, and H. R, 8364, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935) 649 90, 180,
202, 230, 242; N. Y. Times, May 12, 1936, at 41, col. 1.
161. The railroads themselves cannot give an accurate estimate of the amount of
traffic they would recover were the Pettengill Bill enacted. N. Y. Times, May 25, 1936,
at 29, col. 2.
162. 49 STAT. 543, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-327 (1935). This Act empowers the Com-
mission, inter alia, to prescribe maximum and minimum rates foyl common carriers by
motor vehicle and minimum rates for contract carriers, 'to prescribe reasonable require-
ments for service and management, to prevent undue preferences or prejudices among
common carriers, and to prescribe reasonable rates for common carriers. Thete is no
express prohibition upon long-and-short-haul discrimination in this Act. See Comment
(1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 945.
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not be increased and the new rail competition that will be made possible may
offset the gains from water and motor competition for individual carriers if
not for the whole industry. Even if it be assumed that rail revenues will be
enhanced by the Pettengill Bill, there still is grave doubt as to the wisdom
of such legislation. Whatever benefits this Bill would make possible for the
railway industryir 3 would be gained at the expense of shipping and trucking
industries in which the public interest is not negligible. 4 Furthermore, the
repeal of Section 4 would subject small shippers by rail and small intermediate
points to undue discrimination because of their limited bargaining power.'"
Thus it appears that the benefit to the public from this Bill not only is
difficult to evaluate but may prove to be illusory. And since the abuses which
often result from inadequate regulation of common carriers are so well known,
it might be better to abandon the Pettengill Bill in favor of an alternative
policy of railroad relief-that of adequate regulation of all transportation
agencies.
The Emergency Transportation Act of 1933 created the office of Federal
Coordinator of Transportation, with power, among other things, to "inves-
tigate and consider means ... of improving transportation conditions through-
out the country."' 65  Carrying out this mandate, Coordinator Eastman ini-
tiated a far flung investigation of the transportation industry. In his reports,
the Coordinator recommended and has continued to urge complete regulation
by the government of all common carriers as the best solution of the present
transportation problem."6 Pursuant to these suggestions, Congress has recently
placed interstate motor carriers under the jurisdictions of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.'6 2  Further, a bill proposing similar regulation of water
carriers has been presented to Congress.
67
163. Advocates of the bill claim that it may mean the re-employment of as many
as 100,000 railroad workers. See Hearings, supra note 160, at 300; N. Y. Times, May
13, 1936, at 35, col. 1.
164. The railroads contend that small interests will be amply protected by other
sections of the Transportation Act, as, for example, those which give the Commisnon
the power to prescribe maximum and minimum rates f§ 15 (1), to suspend and inves.
tigate rates [§ 15 (7)], to prevent unreasonable rates [§ 1 (5)], and to prevent undue
preferences to persons and to places [§§ 2, 3 (1)]. See Hearings, supra note 160, at 22,
186, 218.
Yet railroads in their rate making policies undoubtedly will tend to favor large interests.
And since under the Pettengill Bill railroads will be free to place into effect lower charges
for longer distances unless interested parties raise objections, smaller interests can avoid
discriminations only by appealing to the Commission. Despite the fact that the burden of
proof is placed upon the carriers, the expense and inconvenience of such procedure
probably will prevent small shippers and localities from rcsisting long-and-short-baul
discriminations effectively.
165. 48 STAT. 216, 49 U. S. C. A. § 263 (1935).
166. Regulation of Transportation Agencies-Report of Federal Coordinator of Trans-
portation, Snr. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 10-13, 23-41, 53, SS, 95-97;
Report of Federal Coordinator of Transportation on Transportation Legislation, H. R.
Doc. No. 89, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) v. 1, pp. 14-27; Fourth Report of Federal
Coordinator on Transportation Legislation, Jan. 21, 1936, pp. 3-7.
167. S. 1632, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). For a discussion of this Bill, see Report of Fed-
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One of the purposes of the system recommended by the Coordinator is to
end discrimination against railroads in their competition with unregulated or
partially regulated water carriers and trucks. Another purpose is to enable
the Commission to improve the financial condition of all carriers by adjusting
the rate levels of all. A third is to eliminate wasteful cross-hauling and the
necessity for long-and-short-haul discrimination by permitting each agency of
transportation to dominate the field in which it can act most efficiently.
Finally, by expanding the power of the Commission, Coordinator Eastman's
proposal will enable the Commission to compromise more equitably the inter-
ests vitally affected by rate regulation.
CONCLUSION
The repercussions which might result from a relaxation of governmental
regulation as proposed in the Pettengill Bill on the one hand or from the
extension of Commission control to all carriers on the other, are difficult to
visualize or to evaluate. Even from a purely economic standpoint there is
no single proper course to adopt. Economic theory, however, will play little
part in the resolution of this problem. Sharp clashes of economic interests,
impinging directly upon the regulation of transportation charges, find expres-
sion through political pressure. Conflicts between shippers, between terminal
and intermediate localities, between producing areas, between distributing
areas, between railroads, and between the various types of carriers, all com-
peting vigorously for the production, transportation, or distribution of goods,
are among those represented with varying degrees of effectiveness along poli-
tical lines. There is also fundamental disagreement as to policy. Economy
of transportation, permitting that carrier to haul which can do so the cheapest,
is balanced against protection of the billions of dollars which have been
invested in the railways; and the distance principle of rate making conflicts
both with the policy of permitting carriers freedom in increasing their revenues
and with the American pride in conquering distance and having goods trans-
ported freely from one end of the country to another. Since the impossibility
of determining the actual cost of moving a particular quantity of a given
commodity between two known points makes the distance principle difficult
of application, perhaps frankly acknowledged considerations of social and
regional welfare, rather than a futile quest for costs, would serve as standards
in a system of rate regulation.' 0 8 A simple formula, however, like the long.
and-short-haul clause, will always be inadequate to resolve these conflicts of
interest and policy.
eral Coordinator of Transportation, op. cit. supra note 166, at 41-45, 164-169, 333; Fourth
Report of Federal Coordinator, op. cit. supra note 166, at 10-33. This Bill does not
contain an express prohibition against long-and-short-haul discrimination.
Although common and contract carriers by water at present are in part subject to
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Shipping Board, the.o
tribunals have insufficient power to regulate them adequately.
168. See Shulman, Book Review (1936) 45 YALEz L. J. 558.
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COMMENTS
PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE HOLZER CASE: SUABILITY OF
A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OWNED CORPORATION;
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
GERMAN NON-ARYAN LAWS
ONE of the features of the 1924 reparations agreement between Germany and
the Allies was a provision that Germany should turn over the operation of its
government owned railroad system to a corporate entity, which was to pay a
portion of its earnings to the reparations trustee.' Pursuant to that agreement,
the German government organized, and acquired a major portion of the stock
in a corporation known as the Deutsche Reichsbahngesellschaft (hereafter called
the Reichsbahn) which took over the operation of the German railroads. In
1931 the plaintiff, a German citizen of Jewish extraction, was a partner in
the forwarding firm of Schenker' & Co., the successful development of which
had been due largely to the plaintiff's efforts. At the close of that year, the
Schenker partnership was transformed into a corporation and ultimate control
of the business was centered in the Reichsbahn through a pyramid of holding
companies involving two intermediate corporations. In the course of that trans-
action, a contract was entered into by the new corporation, the intermediate
holding companies, and the Reichsbahn whereby the plaintiff was engaged to
act as general manager of the new corporation from 1932 until 1934. In 1933
the plaintiff was discharged by the Director General of the Reichsbahn, acting
on behalf of all four corporations, the dismissal being based solely on the
ground that the German Non-Aryan legislation made such a dismissal impera-
tive.2 The plaintiff commenced suit in New York against all four corporations
by attaching property of the Reichsbahn and the new corporation in that
jurisdiction, claiming damages primarily for wrongful discharge on the theory
first that the Non-Aryan legislation did not require his dismissal, second, that
the particular act under which he was dismissed was unconstitutional, or at
least enacted in excess of delegated powers, and third, that the defendants could
not rely on the Non-Aryan law as a defense because of its repugnancy to the
public policy of New York. In addition to other defenses, the Reichsbahn
claimed immunity from suit on the ground that it was a government instru-
mentality, and the German government itself intervened to obtain immunity
for the Reichsbahn as its property. Although the case has not yet proceeded
to a final adjudication on its merits,3 it presents several questions of inter-
1. London Convention of August 16, 1924 (Dawes Plan) ; see Deutscbcs Reichsgeetzblatt
1924, II, 289; George A. Finch, The London Conference on the Applicalio of the Dawes
Plant (1924) is Am J. INr. L. 707.
2. The German statutes and ordinances referred to are as follows: Gesetz zur Wieder-
herstellung des Berufsbeamtentums of April 7, 1933, Reichsgesetzblatt 1933, I, 175; 2.
Ausfuehrungsverordnung zum Berufsbeamtengesetz of May 4, 1933, Reichsge-etzbhatt 1933,
I, 233; Ordinances of the Reichsbaln of April 18, 1933 and June 14, 1933.
3. It has been decided that the complaint states a cause of action. Holzer v. Deutsche-
Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, N. Y. L. J, March 28, 1936, at 1579, col. 1 (App. Div., 1st Dep't).
Jurisdiction exists as to the intermediate corporations because their corporate entity had been
ignored by officials of the Reichsbahn. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahngesellschaft, N. Y.
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national law and the conflict of laws. Two of these will be discussed in this
Comment: first, the liability of the Reichsbahn to suit; and second, the
applicability of the German Non-Aryan laws in proceedings before American
tribunals.
I
Whether the immunity from suit universally accorded a sovereign state is
to be extended to a corporation such as the Reichsbahn depends on international
law regarding the suability of a government owned corporation as applied by
the American courts. As governments have made increasing use of the corporate
device to invade the field of economic enterprise, there has been a decided,
although not entirely clear-cut tendency in international law to subject such
corporations to suit.4 The American decisions applying international law have
to some extent followed this general trend,5 a result which is not surprising in
view of the fact that in the field of domestic law, federal and state owned cor-
porations have almost always been denied immunity.0 There are cases, how-
ever, in which a unit owned by a foreign government has been held not liable
to suit.7  Although the rationale of these decisions is far from clear, they
appear to be founded on one or both of two interrelated premises: first, that
the unit operating the enterprise is not suable if it can be said that it is not
a separate corporate entity, either because the usual steps in creating a cor-
poration were not taken, or because the corporate paraphernalia has been entirely
disregarded by the government, the business being directly controlled by gov-
ernment administrative officials rather than by corporate officers in accordance
L. J., Feb. 5, 1936, at 655, col 1 (Sup. Ct.). So far as the affidavits disclose, the
Reichsbahn is not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn
Gesellschaft, N. Y. L. J., April 11, 1936, at 1839, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). See decision In Holzer
v. Deusche Reichsbahn et al., N. Y. L. J. June 22, 1936, p. 3171 (Sup. Ct,): Motion to
strike out defense based on the German Non-Aryan laws granted, since these laws are
repugnant to American public policy (Collins, J.).
4. See comment on article 26 of the Draft Convention on "Competence of Courts in
Regard to Foreign States" of the Harvard Law School Research in International Law
(1932) 26 Amf. J. INT. L. Supp. 716.
5. Coale v. Sociat6 Cooperative Suisse des Charbons Bile, 21 F. (2d) 180 (S. D. N. Y.
1921); United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat-Gesellschaft, 31 F. (2d) 199 (S. D. N. Y.
1929); cf. Amtorg Trading Corporation v. United States, 71 F. (2d) 524, 528 (C. C.
P. A. 1934) (the doctrine of "piercing the veil" of a government owned corporation was
sharply rejected).
6. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 9 Wheat. 904 (U. S. 1824);
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U, S.
549 (1922); Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 110 Atl. 788 (1920) ; see
Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 VA. L. RV. 351, 372-396;
Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1235, 1236. Contra: McCarthy v. U. S. Shipping Bd.
Merchant Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 547 (1932).
7. Oliver American Trading Co., Inc. v. Government of Mexico, 5 F. (2d) 659 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1924); Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. (2d) 705
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N. E.
876 (1908); Bradford v. Director General of Railroads of Mexico, 278 S. W. 251 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925).
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with the conventional corporate ritual; second, that even though a separate
corporate entity exists, the corporation is entitled to immunity if it is operating
an enterprise which is considered governmental in nature where the business
is conducted, regardless of the fact that it might be treated as a private enter-
prise in the United States.
The chief factors to be considered in determining whether the Reichsbahn
is entitled to immunity under either of these principles relate to its organization
and structure. The present status of the Reichsbahn is regulated by the law
of August 30, 1924,8 as amended by the law of March 13, 1930,9 which organ-
ized the Reichsbahn as a separate legal entity in accordance with the repara-
tions agreement.' ° In order to enable the new organization to pay its share
of the reparations, the German Reich transferred to it the exclusive right of
operating the entire German railway system, all the rights connected therewith,
the cash on hand, and the fixtures and movable property necessary for the
conduct of the enterprise. The Reich, however, retained ownership of the
immovable property and rolling stock. The Reichsbahn is capitalized at 15
billion Reichsmark, 13 billion being represented by common stock owned by
the Reich, and 2 billion being represented by preferred stock held at least
predominantly by the general public. The preferred stockholders have certain
limited rights of membership, among which is the right to elect a minority of
the 18 members of the Board of Management. Far-reaching control is assured
to the Reich, however, since it can veto the appointment of members of the
Board of Management and of the Directorate and its powers in this regard
are not dependent upon the retention of its stock. Furthermore, the Reichsbahn
is under certain obligations to the Reich, the chief of which is the duty to
operate the railway system with a view to the general political and economic
interests of Germany. The management of the Reichsbalm is in the hands of
its own officers who are not officials of the German government, although the
Reich takes some part in their appointment. It therefore appears that the
Reichsbahn occupies a somewhat anomalous position. While its structure is
undoubtedly that of a corporation, it is neither an ordinary private corporation
subject to the commercial code, nor can it be classified as any particular type
of public corporation. Its legal nature is highly controversial," and may best
8. Gesetz ueber die Deutsche Reichsbahngesellschaft, Reichsgesetzblatt 1924, 11, 272;
Satzung der Deutschen Reichsbahngesellschaft, id. at 281.
9. Gesetz zur Aenderung des Reichsbahngesetzes, ReichsgEetzblatt 1930, 1, 359.
10. An ordinance of February 12, 1924 had already partially emancipated the Reichsbahn
from the general budget of the Reich in anticipation of the ultimate separation. Reichs-
gesetzblatt 1924, I, 57.
11. Compare Lassar, Rekhsseigene Ver waltung (1926) 14 JAmaucar des OEirF2 "x.xCInr
Ricnis 186, 198; 0. Buehler, in 1 HANDBUCH DEs D -SCe=; SrTar s rcnts (1930) 599;
v. Kienitz, V ° "Eisenbahnstaatsrecht," in 2 HANDWOE aTR-UcH DiM Rzc=swssnxrca xS '
(1927) 231, 235; HLLEBRAND, DIE AuEsicn ISREMc DES DLU cnmW RCxcHS UEDM DM-
DEUTSCE RUCHSBHANGEsF.LSCEMT NACE GETENDFar Ricn (1934) 2 et seq. (with
extensive further references); K. FnrrscH3, Eis BAHNCEsELTEOEnUG n. DEuTcm:EN RnEcu
(1930) 26, n. 3; SiGLocH, Dri UxTERNEmxuGEN DE OEFNT"n, _"C H,,D (1929) 85;
AscUE[Tz, DIE V.'ASSUNG DES DEU'TSCHF'q REICHS (1929) 391; Groeschner, Zur rcchtlichn
Stellung der Deutschen Reichsbahngesellschaft (1926) Duisc JuUSTE*NzErru.IT 439.
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be characterized as a peculiar, sui generis combination of private and public
law elements.
But despite the ambiguous nature of the Reichsbahn, there can be little, if
any doubt that it is a distinct legal entity, and hence not entitled to immunity
from suit on the ground that it is merely an administrative department of the
German government. This conclusion seems entirely justified by the fact that
the chief purpose in organizing the Reichsbahn was to create a separate cor-
porate entity to satisfy the terms of the reparations agreement, that a portion
of the stock carrying some voting rights is privately held, and that the manage-
ment of the enterprise is delegated to corporate officers rather than to admin-
istrative officials of the Reich.
There is room for more dissension as to whether the Reichsbahn should be
granted immunity on the ground that it performs a governmental function.
In support of this basis for immunity, it can be urged that the operation of
the railroads has traditionally been regarded as a governmental function in
Germany, and that this attitude is embodied in the present organization of
the Reichsbahn, both in the provisions vesting partial control in the Reich
apart from its stock ownership, and in those imposing a duty on the Reichsbahn
to operate the railroads in furtherance of the political and economic welfare
of Germany. On the other hand, it can be argued that although the operation
of the German railroads may formerly have been considered governmental in
character, the deliberate transfer of that function from the government to a
separate corporate entity indicates that it is no longer to be so considered,
particularly since the experts chiefly responsible for drafting the reparations
agreement providing for this transfer came from countries in which the opera-
tion of the railroads has traditionally been considered a private enterprise.12
An additional, though not decisive argument against classifying the Reichsbahn
as a public corporation may be derived from the President's Ordinance of
October 6, 1931, relating in part to the salaries of public and quasi-public
officials, which provides that for the purposes of that Ordinance the Reichsbahn
is not to be considered a corporation of public law.18 While the proper solution
of the problem is therefore open to some doubt, it appears justifiable to deny
the Reichsbahn immunity on this ground also, in view of the present com-
mendable tendency to subject to suit government owned corporations which
engage in enterprises of an economic nature.
Since the Reichsbahn bases its claim to immunity on its alleged character
as both a governmental agency and property of the Reich, the question arises
as to whether an additional ground for denying immunity may be found in
Article 281 of the Berlin Treaty of November 14, 1921, restoring friendly
relations between the United States and Germany.' 4 The Article provides that
"if the German government engages in international trade, it shall not in
respect thereof have or be deemed to have any rights, privileges or immunities
of sovereignty." It is identical with similar clauses of the principal peace
12. See Lassar, op. cit. supra note 11, at 187; Buehler, op. cit. supra note 11, at 600.
13. Part II, c. 5, subsection 1, par. 15, Reichsgesetzblatt 1931, I, 537, 548,
14. U. S. Treaty Series, No. 658.
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treaties from which it was borrowed,' 5 and must be interpreted in light of the
meaning commonly attributed to those clauses.' 0 These provisions are generally
understood as an express recognition of the doctrine that state immunity is to
be limited to strictly governmental, as distinguished from economic activities.
It might therefore be urged that if the Reichsbahn is considered as a part
of the Reich, it is subject to suit under this Article. But it appears doubtful
that the provision should be thus applied. The phrase "engages in international
trade" seems to exclude from its purview the entire complex of the railway
business. In the only known decision involving its interpretation, it has been
construed to cover only those trade activities whose immediate object is the
exchange of commodities.17 Accordingly, it would not apply to the Reichsbahn,
despite the activities engaged in by a New York branch of that organization.1 8
Under this interpretation, Article 281 of the Berlin Treaty of 1921 cannot be
invoked as a further argument for subjecting the Reichsbahn to suit, and if
the Reichsbahn were found to be identical with the Reich, it would be entitled
to immunity.
II
It is clear that the relations between the parties in the instant case, including
those concerning the termination of the contract, would ordinarily be governed
by German law, since the contract was made in Germany by parties domiciled
there, and was to be performed in that country. Accordingly, if the discharge
of the plaintiff was authorized by the German Non-Aryan law, a complete
defense would be available to the defendants in the absence of further con-
siderations. But the plaintiff maintains that the defendants cannot rely on
that law as justifying his discharge because it violates fundamental conceptions
of American public policy by discriminating between Jews and non-Jews, and
hence, under well-recognized doctrine, must not be applied in the courts of
this country.
It requires no close examination of the German anti-Semitic statutes eliminat-
ing Jews from the political, cultural and economic life of Germany, tar conclude
that they are opposed to deeply rooted principles of American social morality
15. Treaty of Versailles, Art. 281; Treaty of St. Germain, Art. 233; Treaty of Trianon,
Art. 216; Treaty of Neuily, Art. 161.
16. For general discussions of these provisions, see Trachtenberg, L'immuniM jttdic;aire
de l'tat et les reprsentations commerciales de l'W. R. S. S. a LPtranger (1931) 26 RM xv
DamaAs 757, 761; Ch. de Visscher, Les gouvernements Itrangcrs en justice (1922) Rsvun Dz
Daorr ENTERNAIONAL Er DE LfGISL0TION COMPARgE 303; Now; RVUEr DES Cor's Ac.
Dr- L-., 1924, II, 368; Niboyet, note in Smmr (1930) 49; WAxxmns, TnE STATE AS A
PARTy LmGMNr, (1927) 190; SCENK v. STAUFFExNER0, DI RECHTSTELLMxG DEnf nUSSqsann=
ErAlDELSVERTRETxUGEN (1930) 89.
17. Decision N. RI. 1360/22 of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia (1922), partly
reprinted in (1932) 26 AI. J. INT. L. Suyl. 602-604.
18. The plaintiff argues that the transaction of business by the New York branch of
the Reichsbahn brings the latter within the 'phrase "engages in international trade!' The
Reichsbahn denies, however, that the New York branch does active business, except for
performing such functions as giving information to shippers.
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embodied in the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.10 Since
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, numerous decisions have inter-
preted this provision as prohibiting legal discrimination by the states based
on distinctions of race or color. 20  Whatever apparent exceptions to this general
principle have been established are not only of minor importance, but have also
been rationalized by arguments which purport to leave the principle itself
unimpaired.21 Little emphasis is needed to point out that the public policy
expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment is sufficiently imperative to render
inoperative ordinary rules as to the conflict of laws. Consequently there are
strong reasons for considering the entire body of the German Non-Aryan legis-
lation, including the particular acts here involved, as repugnant to the public
policy of this country. 22 But whether the New York court should, in the
present case, resort to the public policy argument and refuse to apply the
German Non-Aryan law depends upon further considerations.
Under the more liberal modern conceptions as to the proper function of
the public policy doctrine in any system of conflict of laws, it is well recognized
that unless checked it may be destructively applied as a factor interfering
with the normal play of private international law principles. Although num-
erous attempts to reduce its vagueness and unpredictability and to circumscribe
closely its sphere of operation have proved futile, its application has been limited
to some extent.
19. It is well settled that public policy in the sense here used may find expression either
in constitutions, statutes or judicial records. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry., 175 U. S. 91, 100 (1899); Becker v. Interstate Business Men's Ace. Ass'n,
265 Fed. 508 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. 299 (C. C. E. D. Ark. 1884);
Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931); People v. Hawkins, 157
N. Y. 1, 12, 51 N. E. 257, 260 (1898); Taylor v. Leonard, 275 S. W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
20. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356, 369 (1886); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1938); Opinion of the Supreme Court
of Judicature of Massachusetts, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N. E. 558 (1911); Riggsbee v. Town
of Durham, 94 N. C. 800 (1886).
For discussions of the equal protection clause and the general policy behind it, see
COOLEY, CoxsTritoNAL LAW (4th ed. 1931) 283; FLAcex, Tn. ADOMPON Or Ta FOUR-
TEENTH AmDDIfENT (1908).
21. The most important exception concerns miscegenation laws which are upheld as; not
discriminating against either white of colored persons since they apply to both. State v.
Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1890); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883).
22. As to what extent the German Non-Aryan laws may clash with the local policies
of other states, compare Neuner, Das neue reichsdeutsche Eherecht vnd die schechoslovaklsehye
Rechtsordnung (1935) 15 PRAGER JusIrIscHE ZEITSB MUT 797, 802 (the German pro-
hibition of intermarriage between Aryans and Non-Aryans believed repugnant to Czecho-
slovakian public policy); W. van Hille, La loi allenande d6fendant les mariages entre aryens
et juifs peut-elle tre appliquie en Belgique, LA BimoIQuE JuDICIARE, Jan. 1, 1936, col. 29;
and see extehisive references in (1936) 34 BUuLErIM DE L'INsTITUT JUIRIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL
32, 220, regarding Holland, Belgium, Hungary, Dutch East Indies. The situation in Holland,
for instance, is complicated by the fact that Holland is bound to Germany by the Hague
convention of 1902 concerning entrance into marriage, which limits the scope of the public
policy exception. For general desdription of these statutes see The "Non-Aryan"' in German
Law (1936) 181 L. T. 152, 173.
Mention should first be made of a restriction which is often said to exist,
but which is apparently not observed in the majority of cases. It has become
usual to distinguish between two possible applications of the public policy
doctrine. If, in a particular case, it is employed to nullify a foreign law which
is relied upon as a basis for recovery, its application results in prohibiting a
recovery which would otherwise be granted. If, on the other hand, the law
in question is relied upon as a defense, as in the instant case, the application
of the doctrine results in permitting a recovery otherwise unobtainable.Y This
distinction between the prohibitive and permissive aspects of the doctrine is
of little significance so far as continental rules as to the conflict of laws are
concerned, provided that the other prerequisites of the public policy principle
are fulfilled.24 But in regard to the American system of the conflict of laws,
Professor Lorenzen has stated that as a general rule, the doctrine is applied in
this country only to prohibit and not to permit recovery.2 5 And this view finds
further support in the wording of Section 612 of the Conflict of Laws Restate-
ment, which merely provides that "No action can be maintained upon a cause
of action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the
strong public policy of the forum,"20 thus apparently excluding by implication
the possibility of employing the doctrine in its permissive aspect. The actual
trend of the decisions, however, seems to move in the opposite direction,
affirmative relief being granted in a large number of cases in which it would
have been denied had the law ordinarily controlling not been considered re-
pugnant to the public policy of the forum. 7 In most of these cases, the local
23. Obviously, in the majority of cases the public policy doctrine operates in a pro-
hibitive manner. The other alternative is, however, by no means negligible. But its in-
frequent occurrence explains why the distinction referred to has come to be used only
comparatively recently. See LFWALD, DAs DEuTscHE LNwTrATxo!.AL. Paz Tnxcu (1931) 36.
24. See LEWALD, loc. cit. supra note 23. But see Msxacnzon, Dic GnRu"xLM DES
DE Tsc E, INTEmATONAr, PRrvARHr.cns (1932) 334, 341.
25. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 Y,=
L. J. 736, 747.
26. RESTATEm=rrT, Co.N=CTr or LAws (1934) § 612.
27. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873); The Kensington, 183 U. S.
263 (1902); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kempton, 138 Fed. 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905);
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Hathaway
v. The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 373, 396 (S. D. N. Y. 18S6); Mlonroe v. The Iowa, 50
Fed. 561 (D. Mass. 1892); Lewisohn v. National Steamship Co., 56 Fed. 602 (E. D. N. Y.
1893); The Hugo, 57 Fed. 403 (S. D. N. Y. 1893); The Guildhall, 58 Fed. 796 (S. D.
N. Y. 1893); The Glenmavis, 69 Fed. 472 (E. D. Pa. 1895); Vandalia Rr. Co. v. Kelley,
187 Ind. 323, 119 N. E. 257 (1918); Hagenbeck and Great Wallace Show Co. v. Randall,
75 Ind. App. 417, 126 N. E. 501 (1920); Chicago, B. & Q. Rr. Co. v. Gardner, 51 Neb.
70, 70 N. W. 508 (1897); Meacham v. Jamestown Rr. Co., 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653
(1914); James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369
(1925); Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479
(1930); Strauss v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930), noted
in (1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 495; The Vladikavkazcky Railway Co. v. The Net-: York Trut
Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934); Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 138 Wis.
648, 120 N. W. 399 (1909); see Joint Stock Co. v. National City Bank, 240 N. Y. 368,
377, 148 N. E. 552, 555 (1925); 1 WmAnmyoa, Co.rrxzcr or Lws (1905) §§ 127, 150, 150 a,
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public policy operated to bar a defense which would have been available under
foreign law, thereby sustaining the plaintiff's action. In view of this line of
authorities, it may be stated as a general rule that whenever a stringent public
policy of the forum requires, not only foreign laws sustaining, but also foreign
laws denying recovery may be disregarded. Under this rule, there should be
no hesitation in the instant case to strike out the defense based on the German
statute as contravening public policy merely because in so doing, the court
would be giving a permissive rather than a prohibitive effect to the public policy
doctrine.
There is another restrictive principle, however, which is more generally
operative, a principle which may be described as a rule of relativity, in that
the public policy concept is not only given diverse application as between different
states and within the same state at different periods, but furthermore it is
applied in varying degrees in the same place and at the same time so as to
affect a foreign law in one situation and leave it unimpaired in another. The
"criterion determining whether the local policy is to nullify a foreign law in a
particular case is the closeness of the relation between the case and the forum.
Just how directly local interests must be affected in order to bring the public
policy doctrine into play cannot be precisely defined. Clearly the mere fact
that a case is pending before a court does not suffice, for the doctrine is not
to be used by the judges of one country as a convenient vehicle for pronouncing
their condemnation of legislative policies adopted elsewhere. But what addi-
tional points of contact between the particular case and the forum must be
shown lies in the sound discretion of the local courts to determine as each case
arises.
This principle of relativity is firmly established in the United States.28
Implicit in many of the older cases,29 it has been expressly referred to in a
series of recent decisions. 30 It has even been indicated that a refusal to apply
150 c, 154, 162; RESTA1T=T, CoasucIr or LAWS, N. Y. ANNOT. (1934) § 612, p, 386;
Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 997, 1001 et seq. Contra: Forepaugh v. Railroad Co.,
128 Pa. 217, 18 AtI. 503 (1889) (one judge dissenting).
28. Strauss & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Rr. Co., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930);
see RESTATEM'ENT, Corrcr or LAws, N. Y. ANNor. (1934) p. 388; Comment (1933) 33
CoL. L. REV. 750, 751.
29. See, e. g., The Kensington, 94 Fed. 885 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899), rev'd on other grounds,
183 U. S. 263 (1902), where the local policy could operate since the connection with the
forum was sufficiently dose.
30. Thus, in Citizens National Bank v. Waugh, 78 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935),
it was said at 327 that the courts may not refuse on grounds of public policy to enforce
a contract which is valid under the law of the state where it was made if "the Interests
of the forum have but slight connection with the substance of the contract obligation."
And in The Fri, 154 Fed. 333, 338 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907), the court refused to consider a
contract which was valid where made, and which was not to be performed within the
forum in any possible way, as "concerning particularly the public policy of the United
States." Similar pronouncements are to be found in other recent cases. See, e. g., Hartford
Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143, 150 (1934); Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 160 (1932); Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assuranco
Society of the U. S., 266 N. Y. 71, 90, 193 N. E. 897, 903 (1934). See also Kosterg,
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foreign rules of law because of local policy when sufficient points of contact
between the case and the forum are lacking could be considered a denial of
due process of law.31  Moreover, the requirement that there be a close con-
nection between the case and the forum may be applied more strictly whenever
it is attempted to give the public policy principle a permisive rather than a
prohibitory effect.
32
In light of these considerations, a refusal to apply the public policy doctrine
so as to invalidate the defense raised in the instant case would seem proper.
All the important operative elements in the case appear to be connected with
Germany rather than the United States. Thus, the contract was entered into
and was to be performed there; all interested parties were German citizens
and domiciled in Germany when the agreement was made; and the alleged
breach occurred in that country. The only incidents tending to connect the
case with the New York forum are the fact that the plaintiff transferred his
residence to that state and commenced suit by attaching property within the
court's jurisdiction. These facts hardly seem of sufficient importance to justify
the application of the public policy doctrine. Accordingly, even if it be granted
that the German Non-Aryan legislation as a whole, as well as the particular
act here in question, contravene fundamental principles of American public
policy, and if it be further conceded that this affords a sufficient basis for
permitting, as well as for denying relief, local interests do not appear to be
so directly concerned as to require that the courts deny extraterritorial effect
to the German law involved.
Sigmund Sichel-
THE RIGHT OF A PARENT CORPORATION TO PROVE A
CLABI IN THE BANKRUPTCY OF ITS SUBSIDIARY
THE courts have been extremely inarticulate in disposing of the legal problems
which are raised when a parent corporation attempts to prove a claim as a
creditor in the bankruptcy or receivership of its subsidiary,' and most judicial
Publi Policy in Private International Law (1920) 29 Y,%a L. J. 745, 757, 75S; Comment
(1923) 32 Yr.E L. 3. 471, 473.
31. See Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 403 (1930); Hartford Acc. &
Ind. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143, 150 (1934); Note (1931) 31 CoL L.
REv. 495, 496, 497.
32. See IELCMOR, op. cit. supra note 24, at 335, 341. Cf., however, deciion of Collins, J,
referred to supra note 3.
fResearch Assistant, Harvard Research in International Law.
1. Simila problems are presented where the sole stockholder in a "one-man corporation"
attempts to prove a claim under similar circumstances, and while the discus-ion herein will
relate to parent and subsidiary corporations, for the most part it will be equally applicable
to the case of the "one-man corporation." See Comment (1932) 45 HMnv. L. REv. 1034;
Comment (1925) 13 CA=ar. L. Rrv. 235. But see Vennerbeck & Clase Co. v. Juergens
Jewelry Co., 53 R. I. 135, 139, 140, 164 Ati. 509, 511 (1933). For a recent disuzaon
of the problems, see LA=, SuBsiDriES AND Ar TLE. Con ro, o ns (1936) 142-155.
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explanations in this field have simply restated results. In language similar to
that used in the cases where a creditor of the subsidiary corporation seeks to
hold the parent liable on his claim, the courts say that where the subsidiary is
a mere "instrumentality," "adjunct," "agent," or "alter ego" of the parent, the
corporate entity of the subsidiary will be disregarded, and the parent's claim
disallowed on the ground that a debtor cannot prove a claim in his own
bankruptcy.
2
Although the language of the courts is of little assistance in formulating
general propositions, the actual facts of the cases suggest lines of analysis by
which it may be possible to reach desirable results in many circumstances
without such frequent resort to unenlightening verbiage. As a device to sim-
plify exposition, assume that the Jones Oil Corporation, engaged in the
production of oil, causes the Jones Oil Sales Corporation to be formed as
a medium through which to market its oil products. The Oil Corporation owns
the entire capital stock of the Sales Corporation, the boards of directors are
composed of the same individuals, and many of the officers of the Oil Corpora-
tion are also officers of the Sales Corporation. In the course of the Sales
Corporation's existence it becomes indebted to the Oil Corporation for advances
of money by the latter and for the purchase price of oil. Subsequently the
Sales Corporation becomes bankrupt, the Oil Corporation files a claim for
$300,000 as the amount owed to it by the Sales Corporation, and contends that
it is entitled to participate pro rata with the other creditors in the distribution
of the assets of the Sales Corporation.
There appear to be two grounds upon which the Oil Corporation can properly
be barred from participation in the distribution. First, the Oil Corporation
clearly cannot participate if it does not establish itself as a creditor of the
Sales Corporation. Second, it cannot participate if it can justifiably be main-
tained that the corporations are not separate entities, so that allowing the Oil
Corporation to participate would be equivalent to permitting an individual to
prove a claim against himself in his own bankruptcy. By varying and adding
to the facts of the basic situation assumed, cases readily suggest themselves in
which the claim of the Oil Corporation could properly be disallowed on one or
both of these grounds.
There are several situations in which the Oil Corporation could be barred
2. Cases illustrating the use of these or similar terms are In re Kentucky Wagon Mfg.
Co., 71 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934); Centmont Corporation v. Marsch, 68 F. (2d)
460 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933); New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 6th,
1918); In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909); In re Otsego Waxed
Paper Co., 28 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 508 (W. D. Mich. 1935); Pagel, Horton & Co. v.
Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 258 N. Y. Supp. 168 (4th Dep't 1932). See also
PowErU, PARENT AND SUBsIIARY CoRPOATI oSs (1931) 4, 89; Douglas and Shanks, Insulation
from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 193; Comment (1936)
24 CA=. L. Rxv. 447; Comment (1933) 46 HARv. L. Ra,. 823. Similar language is found
in cases disallowing the claims of individuals owning all or substantially all the stock of
the corporation. Gordon v. Baton Rouge Stores Co., Inc., 168 La. 247, 121 So. 759 (1929) ;
Samuel Cupples Wooden-Ware Co. v. Illinois Pickling and Mfg. Co., 51 La. Ann. 64, 24
So. 604 (1898); cf. Potts & Co. v. Schmucker, 84 Md. 535, 36 At. 592 (1897); In re
Burntside Lodge, 7 F. Supp. 785 (D. Minn. 1934) (minority stockholders' claim disallowed).
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because it is not a creditor. One such situation is that in which the bankruptcy
receiver or trustee of the Sales Corporation is able to show that the advances
of money to the Sales Corporation and the purchases of oil by the Sales Cor-
poration were transactions entered into with no intent on either side to create
enforceable contractual obligations. On recognized principles of contract law
the Oil Corporation is not a creditor and therefore its claim cannot be allowed.
Again, the court may refuse to treat the Oil Corporation as a creditor if the
Sales Corporation was inadequately capitalized at the outset of its existence,
even though the two corporations intended to create enforceable contractual
obligations. Assume that the Oil Corporation set up the Sales Corporation
with an authorized capital stock of one thousand shares of $100 par value,
of which only three shares were actually issued to the Oil Corporation, thus
giving the subsidiary a paid-in capital of only $300. Assume further that
the Sales Corporation thereafter incurred the purported indebtedness of $300,-
000 for cash advances and oil. Under such a state of facts a few recent cases
suggest that the $300,000, or at least that portion of it necessary to give the
Sales Corporation an adequate paid-in capital,4 will be regarded as a capital
contribution by the Oil Corporation on the ground that it cannot be permitted
to start the Sales Corporation in business life with a paid-in capital grossly
disproportionate to the amount of capital necessary for the normal operation
of such an enterprise. If the Oil Corporation is a contributor of capital and
not a creditor, it cannot compete with the legitimate creditors of the Sales
Corporation for that portion of its claim necessary to give the Sales Corporation
a proper capital structure. Finally, the Oil Corporation may be denied recog-
nition as a creditor and hence excluded from participation in the Sales Cor-
poration's bankruptcy on the ground that it is estopped from asserting that
it is a creditor. Assume that the Oil Corporation advances money to the Sales
Corporation, both corporations intending to create an enforceable contractual
3. New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil and Transport Corp., 34 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A.
2d, 1929) (presenting the converse situation where the parent was the bankrupt); Con-
solidated American Royalty Corp. v. Taliaferro, 78 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935);
cf. Duffy v. Treide, 75 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Gay v. Hudson Electric Power
Co., 187 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911); Samuel Cupples Wooden-Ware Co. v. Illinois Pickling
and Mfg. Co., 51 La. Ann. 64, 24 So. 604 (1898).
4. The cases are not clear as to whether the entire claim would be disallowed or only
that portion necessary to constitute an adequate paid-in capital. The latter would seem
to be the more reasonable result, but its consequence is to place on the courts the burden
of deciding the difficult question as to what constitutes an adequate paid-in capital.
5. Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 287 Mlass. 2S0, 191 N. E. 430 (1934) (the same
individual was treasurer, a director, and the holder of all but one share of the stocl: of a
corporation; he was denied standing as a creditor, his "loans" being considered "capital
contributions"); Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th,
1920) (one individual owned over 905 of the stock of two corporations); Ece In re
Rickshaw, 12 F. Supp. 424, 426 (D. Mlass. 1935); S. G. V. Co. of Del. v. S. G. V. Co.
of Pa., 264 Pa. 265, 269, 107 Atl. 721, 722 (1919) ; cf. Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v.
Adriance Machine Works, 76 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Finn v. George T. Michle
Lumber Co., 41 F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); In re Mill Run Lumber Co., 4 F. Supp.
807 (W. D. Pa. 1933). But see Vennerbeck and Clase Co. v. Juergens Jewelry Co., 53
R. I. 135, 139, 140, 164 At. 509, 511 (1933).
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obligation. Assume further that the Oil Corporation induces certain individuals
to extend credit to the Sales Corporation by representing that the advance was
not a loan and that the Sales Corporation is under no obligation to repay it.
Under these conditions, the Oil Corporation will not be heard to say that It
is a creditor, and will be excluded from participation at the instance of the
class of creditors who have been misled.6
But even if the Oil Corporation can establish itself as a creditor of the
Sales Corporation, it may nevertheless be excluded if it can properly be said
that the corporations are not separate entities so that the Oil Corporation is
in a position analogous to that of an individual attempting to prove a claim
against himself in his own bankruptcy. One situation to which this rule may
be applied is that in which there has been some defect in the process of
incorporating the Sales Corporation so that it does not possess even a de facto
existence. Stockholders of a defectively organized corporation which is said
to lack even a de facto existence are ordinarily held liable to its creditors as
if they were partners or joint adventurers in the enterprise." An attempt by
one of those stockholders to prove a claim in the bankruptcy of the defectively
organized corporation might therefore be defeated on the ground that it was
an effort by a partner to prove a claim in the bankruptcy of the partnership
in competition with partnership creditors--in effect an attempt to prove a claim
against himself. The same result should follow in the case of the Oil Corpora-
tion. Thus, where the Oil Corporation is the majority stockholder in the
defectively organized Sales Corporation, it would have the status of a partner
or joint adventurer, or if it were the sole stockholder, it would be in effect an
individual proprietor. In either case its claim could properly be disallowed
as a claim against itself.
Another situation in which this principle could be applied to bar the Oil
Corporation is that in which the Oil Corporation has so completely assimilated
the Sales Corporation and its business that the corporate entities may justifiably
be disregarded, and the two corporations treated as one unit. Thus, in addition
to the facts originally suggested, it may be assumed that the Oil Corporation
conducts the marketing enterprise directly as if the Sales Corporation had no
existence whatsoever. The Sales Corporation keeps no books of accounts, all
selling transactions being entered on the books of the Oil Corporation. Ono
bank account serves both corporations. No meetings are held purporting to
be meetings of the board of directors of the Sales Corporation. The officers
of the Sales Corporation consult and follow the directions of the 01 Corporation
in renting offices, hiring and firing employees, and making all contracts, whether
for the sale of oil or otherwise. In other words, the Oil Corporation has taken
over the business of the Sales Corporation to such an extent that the affairs
of one are indistinguishable from those of the other. Because the parties
themselves have chosen to disregard the separate corporate entity of the Sales
6. E. E. Gray Corp. v. Meehan, 54 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
7. Beck v. Stimmel, 39 Ohio App. 510, 177 N. E. 920 (1931); Dodd, Partncrship Liability
of Stockholders in Defective Corporations (1927) 40 HAM. L. Rav. 521, and Appendix A
thereto in which the cases are collected; Magruder, A Note on Partnership Liability of
Stockholders in Defective Corporations (1927) 40 HARV. L. RtV. 733.
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Corporation, the courts may properly do likewise. Accordingly, since the two
corporations can be considered as a single corporation, the attempt of the
Oil Corporation to prove its claim in the Sales Corporation's bankruptcy places
it in a position analogous to that of an individual attempting to prove a claim
against himself in his own bankruptcy, and the Oil Corporation's claim can
justifiably be disallowed.8
In one other situation, the same result may be reached even though both
corporations have been correctly organized and the functions, ritual and activ-
ities of each have been separately maintained, so that it is impossible to dis-
regard the individual corporate entities without disregarding the corporation
law under which they were established. Assume that the Oil Corporation has
induced the extension of credit to the Sales Corporation by representations that
the assets of the two corporations are singly owned, and that the two corpora-
tions are different in name only. So far as the creditors who have relied on
such representations are concerned, the Oil Corporation is estopped to deny
that the two corporations are in fact one.9 It might therefore be barred from
S. Parents' claims were disallowed in the following cases on the basis of asaimiation.
In re Kentucky Wagon Co., 71 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934); Centmont Corp. v.
Marsch, 68 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933); Page v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 53 F.
(2d) 27 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) (business trusts); Edward Finch Co. v. Robie, 12 F. (2d)
360 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (corporation's claim in bankruptcy of majority stockholder dis-
allowed); Clere Clothing Co. v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, 224 Fed. 363 (C. C. A.
9th, 1915); In re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905). Similarly where
an individual owns all or substantially all the stock of a corporation, his claim has been
disallowed on the ground that his business and that of the corporation were indisstinguishable.
Gordon v. Baton Rouge Stores Co., 168 La. 247, 121 So. 759 (1929); Samuel Cupples
Wooden-Ware Co. v. Ilinois Pickling and Mfg. Co., 51 La. Ann. 64, 24 So. 604 (1893);
cf. In the Matter of Burntside Lodge, 7 F. Supp. 785 (D. Minn. 1934) (minority stock-
holders' claim disallowed); Potts & Co. v. Schmucker, 84 Md. 535, 36 At]. £92 (1397).
But where there is sufficient separation, the claim of a parent corporation or that of a
sole or majority stockholder has been allowed. Duffy v. Treide, 78 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A.
4th, 1935); Wheeler v. Smith, 30 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); cf. Page], Horton
& Co. v. Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 258 N. Y. Supp. 168 (4th Dep't, 1932). In
many cases the courts hold that the assimilation is sufficient to permit the administration of
the assets of a parent and its subsidiary in a single bankruptcy or receivership. Trustee Syftem
Co. v. Payne, 65 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v.
Caldwell, 58 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); In re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546
(C. C. A. 2d, 1905); In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609 (S. D. Ohio 1907);
cf. Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. Sth, 1935), noted in
(1936) 3 U. or Cmi. L. REv. 330, (1936) 45 Y.re L. 3. 717; First Nat. Bank of Seattle
v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928); Comment (1933) 46 H,%v. L. Ray. 323, 827.
The fact that the legal title to certain assets may be in the Sales Corporation vould
be no impediment to regarding such assets as singly-owned, for the title of the Sales
Corporation may be treated as merely a naked legal title without any beneficial interest,
a title frequently termed that of a "straw man." Cf. Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder,
79 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Alliance Trust Co. v. Streater, 132 La. 102, 161 So.
16S (1935); Phillips v. McIlrath, 237 N. W. 212 (Iowa, 1931).
9. Stark Electric Rr. Co. v. McGinty Contracting Co., 238 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917);
cf. Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633 (1924).
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competing with that class of creditors in the bankruptcy of the Sales Corpora-
tion, since they can maintain that it is attempting to prove a claim against itself.
Aside from the two grounds just considered, another basis upon which the
Oil Corporation's claim might be disallowed has been suggested by some courts.
In substance, it is that the Oil Corporation should be excluded if it is competing
with creditors of the Sales Corporation whose claim against the Sales Cor-
poration is also enforceable against the Oil Corporation.' ° For two reasons,
however, this theory is of doubtful utility as a ground for excluding the Oil
Corporation. In the first place, aside from the cases already considered in
which the two corporations can' justifiably be treated as one, the situations
where creditors can logically be said to have a claim enforceable against both
the Sales Corporation and the Oil Corporation are not very numerous; and
secondly, even though there are some factual situations where the Sales Cor-
poration's creditors might have such a claim, it is difficult to find any logical
basis for the theory itself.
Assume that the Oil Corporation and the Sales Corporation carefully observe
the ritual and reality of separate existence. The boards of directors of each
hold separate meetings; each corporation keeps separate books and bank
accounts; the Sales Corporation rents its offices and employs its clerical force
entirely independent of the supervision of the Oil Corporation. Nor is there
any representation to third persons that the two corporations are one unit.
But secondly, assume that in the conduct of the business of the Sales Cor-
poration, its primary function of selling oil is entirely controlled and supervised
by the Oil Corporation. For example, the Oil Corporation directs the hiring
and firing of all the oil salesmen of the Sales Corporation and all contracts
for the sale of oil are subject to the Oil Corporation's supervision. Under such
facts it is very probable that many courts would hold both corporations liable
to a creditor whose claim arose in connection with a sale of oil, even though
the facts do not disclose the complete assimilation of the Sales Corporation
by the Oil Corporation heretofore considered." But this dual liability can
be justified only in certain narrowly circumscribed factual situations.
It is possible that a creditor might be said to have a claim enforceable
against both corporations because the Sales Corporation is the agent of the
Oil Corporation. This result, however, is not inevitable. In the first place,
although the courts frequently say that under such conditions the Sales Cor-
poration is an agent of the Oil Corporation, this description is in most cases
extremely inaccurate, due to the absence of the consensual relationship necessary
for true agency. 1'2 But conceivably it could be found that the Oil Corporation
10. See Peckett v. Wood, 234 Fed. 833, 838 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Hunter v. Baker
Motor Vehicle Co., 225 Fed. 1006, 1016 (N. D. N. Y. 1915), aff'd 238 Fed. 894 (C. C. A.
2d, 1916).
11. The William Van Driel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918); Dillard & Coffin Co.
v. Richmond Cotton Oil Co., 140 Tenn. 290, 204 S. W. 758 (1918); Mangan v. Terminal
Transportation System, 157 Misc. 627, 284 N. Y. Supp. 183 (Sup. Ct. 1935). But cf.
Finn v. George T. Mickle Lumber Co., 41 F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); Martin v.
Development Co. of America, 240 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
12. See Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F. (2d) 265, 267
(C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58,
61 (1926); cf. Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
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expressly appointed the Sales Corporation to act as its agent in making sales
of oil to third persons, or that the facts present warrant the implication of
such an appointment. Assuming, however, that such an agency relationship
actually exists, it does not necessarily follow that a person having a claim
arising out of a sale of oil would be able to enforce it against both corporations.
For example, if the claim were based on contract and the agency were disclosed,
accepted rules of agency would make the principal alone liable-in this case
the Oil Corporation-and the claim would not be enforceable against the Sales
Corporation as agent, unless, of course, it gave its own promise in addition
to that of the Oil Corporation, its principal. 3 Likewise, if a contract claim
arose where the agency was undisclosed, the doctrine of election would require
that the claimant, upon ascertaining the relationship of principal and agent,
elect which of the two corporations to hold liable, and after his election to
hold one, his claim would not be enforceable against the other.1 4  On the
other hand, if the claim sounded in tort, as where a creditor contracted to
purchase oil in reliance on false representations by the Sales Corporation, the
making of which had been expressly authorized by the Oil Corporation, the
doctrine of election might be inapplicable,' 5 in which case both the Sales
Corporation and the Oil Corporation would be liable in an action of deceit,
whether the agency were disclosed or not. In this case, then, and in that
where the Sales Corporation gives its own promise in addition to giving that
of the Oil Corporation as principal, it can logically be said that a creditor has
a claim enforceable against both corporations.
Other lines of analysis, however, would lead to the conclusion that no dual
liability whatsoever existed. For example, in the factual situation under dis-
cussion, the Oil Corporation and the Sales Corporation might be treated as
independent contracting parties.'0 This relationship negatives any dual liability
of the two corporations. To illustrate, it might be said that in controlling the
sales of oil the Oil Corporation is acting pursuant to a contract with the Sales
Corporation whereby the latter has allocated the function of selling oil to the
Oil Corporation. If a creditor contracts to buy oil on the basis of false repre-
sentations made by salesmen directly under the Oil Corporation's control, the
13. See RE5TAT=m:-r, AGoENcI (1933) §§ 320, 323; AIcmnar, AU;cY (1914) §§ 1405,
1419-1421; cf. New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Corp., 56 F. (2d) 5E0
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
14. For the general rule of agency, see Barrel v. Newby, 127 Fed. 656 (C. C. A. 7th,
1904); RFSTATEuMNT, AGEc,= (1933) §§ 20S-210, 337; Aca", a, op. cit. tsupra note 13,
§§ 1750-1762. For an application of the rule to the situation under discusion, see
Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 280 Fed. 879, 8S1 (M. D.
Ala. 1922).
15. See The Jungshoved, 272 Fed. 122, 127 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); cf. Mirabito v. San
Francisco Dairy Co., 8 Cal. App. (2d) 54, 47 P. (2d) 530 (1935). Contra: Raymond
v. Capobianco, 107 Vt. 295, 178 Atl. 896, 98 A. L. R. 1051 (1935), noted in (1936) 45
Ymxa L. J. 920; (1936) 36 COL. L. RE,. 324.
16. E. g. Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); cf.
Erickson v. Mlinnesota & Ontario Power Co., 134 Mlinn. 209, 158 N. W. 979 (1916);
Joseph R. Foard Co. v. State of Maryland, 219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914).
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Oil Corporation will be liable in an action of deceit.' 7 At the same time, if the
Sales Corporation has no part in the making of the false representations, it
will not be liable in a similar action, since it has delegated the function of
selling to the Oil Corporation. Likewise, if the creditor sues for damages for
breach of contract, and the Oil Corporation had made the contract in its own
name, clearly the Sales Corporation cannot be held on the contract. Moreover,
even if the Oil Corporation had named the Sales Corporation as the obligor
in the contract, it would seem that in view of the independent contractor rela-
tionship such a use of the Sales Corporation's name would be unauthorized and
the Sales Corporation would not be bound.
But even if the courts would hold both the Oil Corporation and the Sales
Corporation liable to a creditor whose claim arose in connection with a sale
of oil, despite the weakness of the doctrines purporting to fix such double
liability, it is still difficult to see why the fact of this dual liability affords
any ground for excluding the Oil Corporation from participating in the bank-
ruptcy of the Sales Corporation. Assume that an individual has one claim
against the Sales Corporation arising out of some transaction entirely apart
from the selling of oil, such as the sale of office supplies to the Sales
Corporation, and a separate and independent claim against the Oil Cor-
poration arising out of a loan to the latter corporation. There appears
no reason why the Oil Corporation should be excluded from competing with
that individual in the Sales Corporation's bankruptcy. And there seems
to be even less reason for preventing the Oil Corporation from competing
with a creditor who has a single claim enforceable against both corporations,
since such a creditor could recover against the Oil Corporation for any
deficiency in his recovery in the Sales Corporation's bankruptcy.
In conclusion, it would seem that once the parent corporation is able to
establish itself as a creditor of the subsidiary, it should always be able to
prove its claim no matter who the creditors are with whom it will compete,
so long as there has been no complete assimilation of the subsidiary's corporate
entity or business by the parent nor any other basis upon which it can be said
that the parent is proving a claim against itself. Of course, in the actual
cases, the facts are not so clearly defined as in the hypothetical cases assumed.
Moreover, it is not to be expected that a strictly logical system will be fol.
lowed out in the face of strong psychological factors. For example, if the parent
had at one time been liable as undisclosed principal to a creditor of the sub-
sidiary, but due to the harsh doctrine of dlection that liability had been extin-
guished when the creditor chose to file his claim in the bankruptcy of the
subsidiary, a court might be reluctant to allow the parent to compete with
the creditor in the subsidiary's bankruptcy, even though the doctrine of election
would bar the recovery of any deficiency against the parent only where the
creditor chose to hold the subsidiary knowing of the agency relationship.
Nevertheless, if in the trial of a case a record is built up which indicates with
considerable clarity the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary,
17. Cf. Joseph R. Foard Co. v. State of Maryland, 219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) ;
Ross v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 106 N. J. L. 536, 148 Atl. 741 (1930); Mitchell v. Lea
Lumber Co., 43 Wash. 195, 86 Pac. 405 (1906).
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in many instances the court will be able to make a proper disposition of the
case without resort to the unsatisfactory verbiage which has often characterized
the decisions in this field.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN CASES INVOLVING COUNTER-
CLAIIS
WH N the jurisdiction of a federal court is invoked in cases involving
counterclaims,' conflicting considerations of policy lead to confusion. On the
one hand, the modem tendency to allow almost all claims between the parties
to be litigated in the same suit, subject only to the limitations of trial con-
venience, 2 and the element of justice in providing security to each party for
his claim against the other, at least in cases where both claims are for money,3
both suggest an expansive view of jurisdiction. On the other hand, a policy
of deference to the power of the state courts, begotten of federalism, indicates
that the federal courts should not assume any jurisdiction in excess of that
clearly granted by the Judicial Code under proper constitutional authority.
In general, there are two important types of cases to which the jurisdiction
of the federal courts may attach, viz., those in which the parties are citizens
of different states and those involving determination of a claim arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States. In both types of cases the
Judicial Code provides that the matter in controversy must exceed the sum
or value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs.4 There is no difficulty, of
course, as to the jurisdiction of the federal courts when both the original
claim and the counterclaim satisfy these requisites of federal jurisdiction.
Trouble of this sort appears only when either the original claim or the counter-
claim alone satisfies the requisites of federal jurisdiction.
The problem is then presented whether the fact that the federal courts have
jurisdiction over one claim is sufficient reason for them to assume jurisdiction
also over another claim which could not be litigated independently in the
federal courts, but which could properly be tried along with the first claim if
no question of federal jurisdiction were involved. Constitutionally the prob-
lem would seem to be whether the two claims constituted a single case or
controversy, for the relevant provisions are that "The judicial Power shall
1. As here used, "counterclaim" refers to a claim by the defendant against the plain-
tiff which is affirmative in nature and could be the subject of an independent suit even
after the adjudication of the plaintiff's claim, unless some other meaning is exprecAy
indicated.
2. See CARAx, CODE PLE--w G (1928) 455.
3. This consideration is pointed out in Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictionar
Limitatiom on Federal Procedure (1936) 49 Y'Ar L. J. 393, 410, at 415.
4. This jurisdiction may be invoked either originally or by removal of a case brought
originally in the state coulUts. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1926), defines
the original jurisdiction, setting forth these requisites. 36 StAT. 1094 (1911), 23 U. S.
C. A. § 71 (1926), defines the jurisdiction on removal, which is limited to suits of which
the district courts are given original jurisdiction.
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extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority; . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States
. . ."5 The Judicial Code makes no attempt to define the scope of a case
or controversy, conferring jurisdiction over "suits of a civil nature, at common
law or in equity."6  But as might have been expected, it has become estab-
lished that where jurisdiction is acquired over a claim, it attaches also to
all matters ancillary and incidental to that claim, by necessary implication. 7
From this proposition has been developed the doctrine that jurisdiction over
the original claim embraces power to determine any counterclaim involving
the same subject matter as the original claim and dependent upon it, so that
it relates to substantially the same controversy and its disposition is necessary
to afford complete relief to the parties.8 It is implicit that there is no
jurisdiction over independent counterclaims which do not themselves satisfy
the requisites of federal jurisdiction.0
These tests are indefinite at best, and give little indication of how bor-
derline cases will be decided. A little more certainty is perhaps to be derived
in the case of equitable counterclaims from the distinction drawn by Equity
5. U. S. CONST., Art. III, § 2. Ordinarily the problem will arise only under th first
of these provisions, where jurisdiction is invoked because of a federal question. In the
diversity of citizenship controversies a constitutional issue will seldom arise, since if the
diversity requirement is met in one claim, it will o~dinarily be satisfied in the other as
well, where no additional parties are involved.
6. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1926). In the cases where the requisite in
question is the amount in controversy, no constitutional issue is involved. But since
this requisite is treated in the Judicial Code as coordinate with the federal question and
diversity requirements, it is unlikely that it will receive different treatment from the courts.
And Congress probably did not mean anything different by "suit" than the Constitution
does by "case" or "controversy."
7. See DoBir, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) § 84.
8. Cleveland Engineering Co. v. Galion Dynamic Motor Truck Co., 243 Fed. 405 (N.
D. Ohio, 1917); Badger v. E. B. Badger & Sons Co., 288 Fed. 419 (D. Mass, 1923);
Mathis v. Ligon, 39 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 846 (1930);
cf. Morgan's Louisiana and Texas Rr. & S. S. Co. v. Texas Central Ry. Co., 137 U. S. 171
(1890); Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian Mining Co., 146 Fed. 166 (C, C. D. Mont. 1906),
approved in Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U. S. 258, 263 (1910); United
States v. Mackey, 214 Fed. 137, 153 (E. D. Okla. 1913).
It is an interesting fact, but is not thought to be significant, that the jurisdictional
amount is not brought into question in any of the cases discussing the intevdependene
of the claim and counterclaim. No reason appears, however, why lack of the requisito
jurisdictional amount would not be as fatal to an independent counterclaim as would
the absence of a federal question or diversity of citizenship, since the requirements are
treated as coordinate in the Judicial Code. It is true that therd are different con-
siderations at the basis of each requirement, but it is felt that a uniform treatment will
be the more satisfactory method of handling the problem.
9. And there are a few express holdings to that effect. Electric Boat Co. v. Lake
Torpedo Boat Co., 215 Fed. 377 (D. N. J. 1914); United States Expansion Bolt Co,
v. H. G. Kroncke Hardware Co., 234 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916); Badger v. E. B.
Badger & Sons Co., 288 Fed. 419 (D. Mass. 1923) ; and cases cited infra note 13.
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Rule 30, which provides that the defendant must plead his claims against
the plaintiff which arise "out of the transaction which is the subject matter
of the suit" and that he may plead any claim which might be the subject
of an independent suit in equity.'0 Although the Supreme Court has not
passed on the question,"1 it seems to be established that the classification of
counterclaims made in Equity Rule 30 affords the proper criterion for deter-
mining whether the counterclaim is closely enough related to the original claim
to be carried along with it regardless of failure to satisfy independently the
federal requisites. Thus, the first type of counterclaim, which must be filed
or lost, is held to be available in the federal courts if the original claim
satisfies the requisites of federal jurisdiction;"- the second type, which the
defendant may plead or not at his option, must itself satisfy those requisites
in order to be available.' 3 But where legal counterclaims are involved, au-
thority is lacking. Under the present provisions of the Judicial Code, state
law is determinative of the federal procedure. It is clear, however, that the
fact that state law provides that a given type of counterclaim may be pleaded
cannot operate to give the federal courts jurisdiction over the counterclaim
unless that jurisdiction is embraced within the constitutional grant of the
federal judicial power.'14 Accordingly, it becomes apparent that state pro-
cedure might require a defendant, upon pain of losing a counterclaim, to file
it even though it is not closely enough connected with the original claim to
warrant a federal court in assuming jurisdiction over it as ancillary to its
jurisdiction over the original claim. Thus, it would seem that the defendant
would necessarily be deprived of his claim if the plaintiff brought suit in the
federal court, unless it should be held that the statute could not be applied
10. 268 U. S. 710 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (1926).
11. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 607 (1926), at p.
609: "... . we need not consider the point that, under the second branch [of Equity Rule
301, Federal jurisdiction independent of the original bill must appear.....
12. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 607 (1926); Kaumagraph
Co. v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
13. Electric Boat Co. v. Lake Torpedo Boat Co., 215 Fed. 377 (D. N. 3. 1914);
Noma Electric Corp. v. Rainbow Electric Mfg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 229 (S. D. N. Y.
1928); Frankhart, Inc. v. Metal Lamp Corp., 32 F. (2d) 920 (E. D. N. Y. 1929); McCabe
& Schoenholz, Inc. v. Frank 3. Quigan, Inc., 36 F. (2d) 1C00 (E. D. N. Y. 1929);
Tennessee Products Corp. v. Warner, 39 F. (2d) 200 (M. D. Tenn. 1929); Universal
Radiator Products Co., Inc. v. Craftsman Radiator Enclosure Co., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 205
(E. D. N. Y. 1933).
It is not suggested that even this criterion makes prediction safe. For, although the
only recurring type of case in which the problem arises is that of a claim for infringement
of patent and a counterclaim for unfair competition, the decisions conflict despite the
fact that they agree on the criterion. For an inquiry into the distinction between the
two types of counterclaims see Shulman and Jaegerman, supra note 3, at 411 et seq.
14. R. S. § 914 (1375), 28 U. S. C. A. § 724 (1926). But the rule seems to be that
non-federal issues can be settled in the federal courts, despite broader state )rules, only
when they can be considered "non-feder-al grounds" of a single cause of action, supported
also by a proper federal ground. Cf. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933), discussed in
Shulman and Jaegermann, supra note 3, at 398-400, 412; note (1936) 45 Yur L. 3. 1287.
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to such a situation on the ground that so to apply it would interfere with the
control of the federal courts over the effect of their judgments or would con-
travene the Fourteenth Amendment in depriving the defendant of all oppor-
tunity to have his claim litigated. But it is unlikely that this theoretical
difficulty will ever materialize, for the code requirements that a counterclaim
must be set up or lost apparently apply only to counterclaims "upon a cause
arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of
the plaintiff's claim,"' 5 and these would seem to be closely enough related to
be considered a part of the same case or controversy for the purpose of federal
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the conclusion seems reasonable that counterclaims
available under the typical code provision as "arising out of the contract or
transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's
claim, or connected with the subject of the action"' 6 should be treated in the
same way as those falling under the first branch of Equity Rule 30 for purposes
of federal jurisdiction, whereas those available solely under the other frequent
provision in an action arising upon contract because themselves arising upon
contract,17 should be adjudicated in the federal courts only if the counterclaim
itself satisfies the requisites of federal jurisdiction.
The difficulties arising from the variety of provisions applicable to legal counter.
claims under the Conformity Act will no doubt be eliminated when the Supreme
Court promulgates uniform rules of procedure for the federal courts. It is inter-
esting to note that the first preliminary draft submitted to the Supreme Court by
the Advisory Committee recommends the adoption in substance of Equity Rule
30, as interpreted, for the rule governing both legal and equitable counter-
claims. If this recommendation is approved, it seems likely that the desirable
result will be achieved that the criterion for determining whether jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's claim will carry with it jurisdiction over the counterclaim
will be identical with that determining whether the counterclaim must be
pleaded, viz., whether the counterclaim "arises out of the transaction which
is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim.' u8
15. CLARK, CODE PLEADmNG, (1928) 446. 16. Id. at 444,
17. Ibid.
18. Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Cou~ts of the United States and tho
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (Preliminary Draft of Advisory Committee,
1936) Rule 18: "The answer must state as a counterclaim any claim which the defendant
has at the time against a plaintiff, which arises out of the transaction which Is the subject
matter of the action, provided the court has jursidiction to entertain the claim and
can, if the presence of third parties is essential for its adjudication, acquire jurisdiction of
such parties. If the action proceeds to judgment without such a claim being set up,
the claim shall be batred.
"The answer may also state as a counterclaim any claim against a plaintiff which
might be the subject of an independent action, provided likewise that the court has Juris-
diction to entertain the claim and can, if the presence of third parties is essential for 1t.
adjudication, acquire jurisdiction of such parties.
"A counterclaim need not defeat or diminish the recovery sought by the plaintiff."
There is still the possibility under the proposed rules, however, for some confusion
arising out of applying state laws in suits removed from the state courts, for Rule 90 (d)
provides, "These rules shall apply to civil actions Yemoved to the district courts of
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An even more complicated problem is posed when the original claim does not
satisfy the requisites of federal jurisdiction, but the counterclaim fulfills all those
requirements. Here the question would seem to be whether the counterclaim can
be considered the principal suit and the original claim regarded as ancillary to it.
The cases do not discuss the interdependence of the original claim and the counter-
claim in these cases, perhaps because the necessary relationship has been
assumed to exist. It seems dear, at any rate, that a sufficiently close connection
between the two must be established so that they can be considered to con-
stitute a single case or controversy in order for a federal court to assume juris-
diction over the whole case in such a situation.1 4  If this condition is con-
cededly met, the question remains whether the jurisdiction of the federal
courts can properly be invoked on the basis of a counterclaim alone. The
cases on the point discuss only whether the amount involved in the counter-
claim may be considered in determining the amount in controversy, but the
same principles should be decisive in regard to the other requisites of federal
jurisdiction.'9 The problem may arise either when the suit is brought originally
in the federal court or when the federal jurisdiction is invoked on removal
from the state courts.
In the first type of situation, the requisites of federal jurisdiction are not
met until the counterclaim is filed and the suit would therefore be dismissed
if that fact were brought to the court's attention before that time. Conse-
quently, the question is resolved into whether the defendant, by filing his
counterclaim, has cured the defect and thereby waived his right to a dis-
missal. Since the counterclaim' fulfills the jurisdictional requirements, the
defect can be regarded as procedural in nature and not going to the subject
matter. It could, therefore, be held to be waived unless the defendant made
his objection seasonably.20 If the claims are not closely enough related to
be considered as grounds of the same cause of action, so as to warrant assump-
tion of jurisdiction over the plaintiff's non-federal claim when the defendant's
claim satisfies the jurisdictional requisites, it seems more orderly to dismiss
the whole case rather than to retain jurisdiction over the defendant's claim 21
When the suit is brought originally in a state court and the jurisdictional
the United States from the state courts, and shall govern all procedure after removal,
and a repleading shall not be ordered unless the court deems it advisable."1 It would be
unfortunate if this r'ule should result in applying the state rule as to counterclaims in a
situation where its criterion for determining what counterclaims must b2 pleaded does
not jibe -with that determining whether the counterclaim may be regarded as ancillary
to the plaintiff's claim.
19. Cf. notes 6 and 8, spra, and note 22, infra.
20. Ginsburg v. Pacific MIut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), rev'g
5 F. Supp. 296 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); cf. 0. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176
Fed. 343 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910), cert. denied, 216 U. S. 620 (1910). But cf. American Sheet
& Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 Fed. 321 (N. . Ohio, 1915) (holding that defendant
may defeat jurisdiction by a voluntary dismial of his counterclaim when it appears
that the plaintiff's claim was insufficient to confer jurisdiction).
21. See discussion, infra p. 1487, of the same problem in cases in which the jurisdiction
of the federal court is invoked upon removal from a state court.
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question is raised by a petition to remove or a motion to remand, the problem
of whether the defendant's claim can be the basis of federal jurisdiction is
squarely presented. Since, in cases involving a single claim, the rules have
been developed that only the allegations of the complaint can be considered
in determining whether a federal question is involved and that the amount
in controversy is to be reckoned by computing the value to the plaintiff of
establishing the right which he asserts in his complaint, the theory has been
advanced that the federal jurisdiction attaches only to those cases in which
the requisites of federal jurisdiction are satisfied from the point of view of
the plaintiff. This "plaintiff-viewpoint theory" is then invoked as compelling
the holding that a counterclaim cannot be considered in determining whether
the requisites of federal jurisdiction are satisfied.2 2  But even if this theory
is sound, it seems that it does not necessarily dictate the conclusion urged.
The question to be decided is whether the defendant is to be treated as a
plaintiff for the purpose of determining whether his affirmative claim may be
the basis of federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff-viewpoint theory cannot be
helpful in answering this question; it cannot be applied until one decides
who is a plaintiff within its meaning. Neither the theory nor the cases from
which it was derived aid in this decision, for they do not indicate whether they
are based on the fact that the plaintiff was the nominal plaintiff as a matter
of procedure or on the fact that his claim was affirmative in nature. The
decision must be made, therefore, with reference to considerations of policy.
If the defendant could have brought his counterclaim as an original suit in
the federal courts, it would seem an unwarranted penalty for his lack of
diligence in bringing suit to hold that because the plaintiff first filed his claim
the defendant must forego either whatever benefit he might derive from hav-
ing his claim determined in the federal courts or the privilege of having the
two claims litigated together. Especially unfair would it be to hold that
he could not invoke federal jurisdiction on the basis of his counterclaim
when it is of the sort which must be set up in the suit brought against him
or be forever barred, since all possibility of having his claim litigated in the
federal courts would then -be precluded by the filing of the original claim
against him in the state courts.23  Likewise, if the plaintiff could have removed
22. DoBiE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 144; DOME, Jurisdictional Amount in the United
States Court (1925) 38 IARV. L. REV. 733. Although the theory refers specifically only
to the amount in controversy, it is apparent that the author would reach the same conclusion
as to the federal question if he considered that point, since he uses as a support fo h$
theory the analogy that the federal question must appear from an examination of the
complaint.
It is conceivable, however, that the plaintiff-viewpoint theory could lead to the con-
clusion that the federal question could not be Yaised in a counterclaim, yet that the
requisite jurisdictional amount could be so supplied. For, while the plaintiff would not
by relying on a federal right simply because the counterclaim did, the amount in con-
troversy, even from the plaintiff's viewpoint, seems to be at least partly determined by
the defendant's counterclaim. Ce~tainly the amount which the plaintiff has at stake
in the suit is affected by the counterclaim. See infra p. 1485.
23. Whether the counterclaim is of this type has accordingly been held to be the factor
determining whether federal jurisdiction can be invoked on the basis of the counterclaim.
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the counterclaim had it been brought as an original suit in the state courts,
it is equally harsh to hold that he has lost his right to resort to the federal
courts because he chose to file his claim in the state courts, which alone
were available, rather than await the possible filing of the claim against him.
From either point of view, the doctrine urged seems to place the choice of
forum where it does not belong and where it would not be if the defendant's
claim did not take the procedural form of a counterclaim, and to give un-
justifiable significance to the trivial fact that the plaintiff filed his claim first.
It would, therefore, be preferable to hold that federal jurisdiction may properly
be derived from a counterclaim which is closely enough connected with the
original claim that the two may be held to constitute a single case or con-
troversy, or suit. The counterclaim should be regarded for this purpose as
an original suit in which the nominal defendant is plaintiff.-
4
One special problem occasionally arises with respect to the requisite juris-
dictional amount, where neither the original claim nor the counterclaim alone
fulfills that requirement. There is some authority for the proposition that
not only may the counterclaim be considered in determining what is the
amount in controversy, but it may be added to the plaintiff's claim to compute
that amountLns The argument advanced is that a party has at stake both
Lee v. Continental Ins. Co., 74 Fed. 424 (C. C. D. Utah, I896); Fearon Lumber &
Veneer Co. v. Lawson, 166 Ky. 123, 178 S. W. 1121 (1915); cf. Merchants Heat and
Light Co. v. J. B. Clow & Sons, 204 U. S. 286 (1907); MfcKown -. Kansas & T. Coal
Co., 105 Fed. 657 (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1901).
24. The cases split on the question. The following hold that jurisdiction may be as-
sumed on the basis of the counterclaim: Clark-on v. Manson, 4 Fed. 257 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1880), rev'g 59 How. Pr. 480 (N. Y. far. Ct. 1850); American Sheet & Tin
Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 Fed. 321 (N. D. Ohio, 1915) serble; Central Commercial Co.
v. Jones-Dusenbury Co., 251 Fed. 13, 19 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918); Ginsburg v. Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), rev'g 5 F. Supp. 296 (S. D. N. Y.
1933); cf. Wolcott v. Sprague, 55 Fed. 545 (C. C. D. Kan. 1891); Sturgeon River Boom
Co. v. W. H. Sawyer Lumber Co., 89 Fed. 113 (C. C. W. D. fich. 1898); Union Oil Co.
of California v. Spradley, 49 F. (2d) 815 (W. D. Wash. 1931) Contra: Falls Wire
aanuf'g Co. v. Broderick, 6 Fed. 654 (C. C. E. D. Mlo. 1881); LaMontagne v. T. W.
Harvey Lumber Co., 44 Fed. 705 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1891); cf. AcKor.wn v. Kans &
T. Coal Co., 105 Fed. 657 (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1901); Crane Co. v. Guanda Centrale,
132 Fed. 713 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1904); Fearon Lumber & Veneer Co. v. Lawson, 166
Ky. 123, 178 S. W. 1121 (1915).
It should be remembered that all these cases deal with the jurisdictional amount. The
considerations might conceivably be different in federal question cases, for it may be said
that here the amount of the defendant's counterclaim is considered in determining the
amount which the plaintiff has in controversy. See note 22, supra. In diversity of
citizenship cases, of course, if the requisite diversity exists as to one party, it ordinarily
will exist as to both. Where additional parties are concerned, as upon cross-bills, see
Shulman and Jaegerman, supra note 3, at 417.
25. Lee v. Continental Ins. Co., 74 Fed. 424 (C. C. D. Utah, 1896) Scnble; American
Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 Fed. 321 (N. D. Ohio, 1915) scrnb;le Central
Commercial Co. v. Jones-Dusenbury Co., 251 Fed. 13, 19 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918) semble; d.
Fearon Lumber & Veneer Co. v. Lawson, 166 Ky. 123, 178 S. W. 1121 (1915) (if counter-
claim must be filed). Contra: Harley v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 245 Fed. 471 (W.
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his right to the amount which he claims and his immunity to the claim of the
other party; he stands to gain or lose not only one of these, but their total,
so that the sum of the claims constitutes the real amount in controversy.
Mathematically, the proposition commands respect. Yet its acceptance would
lead to the result that the federal courts could assume jurisdiction of a suit
involving two claims neither of which satisfied the requisites of federal juris-
diction. Such an expansion of federal jurisdiction is not warranted by the
policy considerations which suggest that jurisdiction can properly be assumed
when the defendant has a claim itself satisfying the requisites of federal
jurisdiction.
26
In this type of case, in which the plaintiff's claim does not satisfy the
requisites of federal jurisdiction, even if it is established that the substantive
requirements of federal jurisdiction are met because those requisites are
satisfied when the counterclaim is also considered, the problem is usually
further complicated by the procedural difficulty involved in determining who
may remove the case from the state to the federal courts. This privilege is
restricted by the Judicial Code to defendants. 27  Therefore, plaintiffs have
been held not entitled to remove because they are not defendants.28 On the
other hand, defendants have been held not entitled to remove because by filing a
counterclaim they become plaintiffs. 29 Logic would seem to require that if
D. Wash. 1913); Fearon Lumber & Veneer Co. v. Lawson, supra; ef. Home Life Ins. Co.
v. Sipp, 11 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926); see Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 (C. C.
S. D. Iowa, 1891); Crane Co. v. Guancia Centrale, 132 Fed. 713 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1904).
26. Where there are two or more plaintiffs, their claims are not allowed to be added
to determine the amount in controversy, unless those claims ate really but one claim
in which they all have an interest. Pinel v. Pine], 240 U. S. 594 (1916); Woods v. Thomp-
son, 14 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
27. In diversity cases there is the added requirement that the defendant must be a
non-resident of the state in which suit is brought. 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U. S. C.
A. § 71 (1926).
28. Waco Hardware Co. v. Michigan Stove Co., 91 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 5th, 1899);
Indian Mountain Jellico Coal Co. v. Asheville Ice & Coal Co., 135 Fed. 837 (C. C. W.
D. N. C. 1905); Illinois Central R. Co. v. A. Waller & Co., 164 Fed. 3 8 (C. C. W. D.
Ky. 1908); Glover Mach. Works v. Cooke Jellico Coal Co., 222 Fed. 531 (E. D. Ky.
1915); Mohawk Rubber Co. of New York, Inc. v. Terrell, 13 F. (2d) 266 (W. D. Mo.
1926); Chappell v. Chappell, 86 Md. 532, 39 AtI. 984 (1898); J. T. Smithers v. T. Smith, 3.5
Tex. Civ. App. 508, 80 S. W. 646 (1904), writ of error dismissed, 98 Tex. 83, 81 S, W.
283 (1904); cf. West v. Aurora City, 6 Wall. 139 (U. S. 1867). Contra: Carson &
Rand Lumber Co. v. Holtzclaw, 44 Fed. 785 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1889); Walcott v. Wat-
son,' 46 Fed. 529 (C. C. D. Nev. 1891); Price & Hart v. T. 3. Ellis &4 Co., 129 Fed.
482 (C. C. E. D. Ark. 1904); Pirce v. Desmond, 11 F. (2d) 327 (D. Minn. 1926);
Zumbrunn v. Schwartz, 17 F. (2d) 609 (D. Ind. 1927); San Antonio Suburban Irri.
gated Farms v. Shandy, 29 F. (2d) 579 (D. Kan. 1928); American Fruit Growers, Inc.
v. La Roche, 39 F. (2d) 243 (E. D. S. C. 1928) ; cf. Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co.,
202 Fed. 771 (S. D. Iowa, 1912).
29. Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 (C. C. S. D. Iowa, 1891); Hansen v. Pacific Coast
Asphalt Cement Co., 243 Fed. 283 (S. D. Cal. 1917); cf. Zumbrunn v. Schwartz, 17 F.
(2d) 609 (D. Ind. 1927). Contra: La Montagne v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co., 44 red,
645 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1891); McKown v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 105 Fed. 657 (C, C. W.
D. Ark. 1901) senble.
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the defendant's claim is to be regarded as an original suit in which the de-
fendant is plaintiff for the purpose of determining whether federal juris-
diction can attach, only the nominal plaintiff should be allowed to remove
since he alone is the defendant to the claim which satisfies the requisites of
federal jurisdiction. But the same reasoning which leads to the conclusion
that the defendent's claim may properly form the basis of federal jurisdiction
dictates that the defendant also should be allowed to remove, especially if
his claim is of the sort which he must plead or lose. And this result can be
attained easily by literal construction of the Judicial Code, for the formal
defendant is technically a defendant. Despite its inconsistency, therefore, the
better view probably is that either party should be allowed to remove in this
situation.30 Some further difficulty may be conjured up, however, because
the defendant's counterclaim has been submitted to the state court at the
time of the filing of the petition for removal. The Judicial Code apparently
contemplates that the petition for removal will be made before the defendant
files any pleadings, since it provides that the parties removing shall "plead,
answer, or demur to the declaration or complaint" within thirty days after
filing of a certified copy of the record.31 But the petition may be filed "at
the time, or any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the
State or the rule of the State court in, which suit is brought to answer or
plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff,"32 there being no re-
quirement that it must be filed before answer. And it seems to be established
that the filing of defensive pleadings does not constitute a waiver of the right
to remove.33 While a different result might be reached when the pleading
filed was a counterclaim, on the ground that the defendant thereby affirmatively
invoked the jurisdiction of the state court, the essential elements of a waiver
are lacking since he had no right to remove until the requisites of federal
jurisdiction were satisfied by the counterclaim's becoming a part of the suit.
Again the problem arises of what should be done with the litigation if the
original claim and counterclaim are not closely enough connected for the
federal court to assume jurisdiction over the original claim simply because
the counterclaim meets the requirements for federal jurisdiction. Perhaps
jurisdiction could be retained over the counterclaim, and the plaintiff's claim
alone remanded. But this would seem to be a procedural anomaly, and
might raise embarrassing questions of venue and jurisdiction over the person
of the plaintiff. It would, therefore, be preferable to remand the whole cause
to the state court. This result might be objected to on the ground that it
imposes a condition on the right to remove not found in the Judicial Code,
viz., that the defendant's and plaintiff's claims must be closely connected.
But this requirement may be said to be embodied in the Judicial Code on
the theory that the two claims are not sufficiently interdependent to be part
30. But cf. DOBIE, op. dt. suPra note 7, at 404.
31. 36 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 72 (1926).
32. Ibid.
33. Wahl, Is the F ing of Pleadings in the State Court a Waiver of the Right to Remove?
(1934) 8 FLA. L. J. 57, and authorities there cited.
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of a single "suit" which may be removed. Or, if this answer is considered
unsatisfactory, since the. problem would ordinarily arise only on the type of
counterclaim which need not be pleaded in the suit brought in the state court,
the objection may be met by holding that the defendant, by filing his claim
in that cause, chose to have the two claims litigated together and thereby
waived his right to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court, which was
without power to adjudicate both claims. Such a result has to commend
it the fact that it will tend to put an end to he litigation, but it may be
considered that the defendant should still be given an opportunity to dismiss
his claim without prejudice and bring an independent action in the federal
court, since his attempt to remove indicates that he did not intend to
abandon his right to pursue his claim there.
There may also be some question of the right to remove in cases in which
both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's counterclaim satisfy the requi-
sites of federal jurisdiction. Either party might be denied the right on the
ground of waiver. The defendant could have removed before filing his coun-
terclaim and by failing to do so might be held to have submitted voluntarily
to the jurisdiction of the state court.8 4 But this result would place upon the
defendant the risk of determining for himself whether the plaintiff's claim
satisfied the requisites of federal jurisdiction, with the possible loss of his
counterclaim if, after the time for filing the counterclaim in the state court
had expired, the federal court decided that it lacked jurisdiction;85 it would
force the defendant to rely on a single ground for invoking federal juris-
diction when in fact he has two grounds. A similar danger would not
threaten the plaintiff if he invoked federal jurisdiction originally, for if his
suit were dismissed he could begin anew in the state courts, unless the statute
of limitations had meanwhile run on his claim. But there is less reason for
holding that he has waived his right to resort to the federal courts on the
counterclaim by reason of filing his own suit in the state courts, for he has
not voluntarily submitted the counterclaim to the state court for its determina-
tion. Unless he ,s to be expected to predict that the defendant will set up
a counterclaim, he should be given an opportunity to have it litigated in the
federal courts, for it may be important that he should have it determined
there although he was indifferent as to the forum in which his own claim was
determined.36
34. 0. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176 Fed. 343 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910), cert.
denied, 216 U. S. 620 (1910) semble; cf. Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. J. B. Clow &
Sons, 204 U. S. 286 (1907) (recoupment, defects in service); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Eastin & Knox, 214 U. S. 153, 160 (1909). But cf. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v.
Winzeler, 227 Fed. 321 (N. D. Ohio, 1915) (suit brought originally in federal court; filling
of counterclaim not a waiver of right to dismissal).
35. Morbeck v. Bradford-Kennedy Co., 19 Idaho 83, 113 Pac. 89 (1910); see Wahl,
supra note 33.
36. The one case in point denies the right to remove. West v. Aurora City, 6 Wall.
139 (U. S. 1867). It suggests that the plaintiff may properly bear the burden of pre-
dicting whether the counterclaim will be filled, "The right of Temoval is given only to a
defendant who has not submitted himself to that jurisdiction; not to an original plain-
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The existing confusion and apparent difficulty in dealing with the problem
of federal jurisdiction in cases involving counterclaimsPt may be attributed in
large measure to the facts that the Judicial Code makes no particular provision
for their treatment and that the courts have consequently dealt with them on
the basis of rules designed for and developed in cases in which there is only
one affirmative claim. A systematic procedure is not impossible, but it is
hardly to be expected to evolve from a haphazard application of inappropriate
regulations, especially against a background of conflicting policies.
tiff in a state court who, by resorting to that jurisdiction, has become liable under the
state laws to a cross-action.' Id. at 141.
37. A few other 'relatively simple subordinate propositions not treated in the text here-
with have been developed. Thus, if the plaintiff's claim does not fulfill the .jurisdictional
requisites, the defendant will not lose his right to a dismissal by filing a counterclaim
which does not itself fulfill those requisites, the defect being one of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 Fed. 321 (N. D. Ohio
1915) semble; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926). But
cf. 0. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner, 176 Fed. 343 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910), cert. denied,
216 U. S. 620 (1910). On the other hand, any irregularities in the procedure of removal
can be waived by failure to make a motion to remand if the essential substantive grounds
for federal jurisdiction exist, so that the court may be said to have jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Mackay v. Vinta Development Co., 229 U. S. 173 (1913). Again,
once jurisdiction has attached, it is not defeated by reason of a voluntary dismisA of
the claim which forms the basis of federal jurisdiction, but will be retained to dispo:e
finally of the whole case. Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U. S. 141 (1914);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 78 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), cert. denied,
296 U. S. 626 (1935). Further, when a case is removed from a court of limited juris-
diction, the limitations on that jurisdiction survive removal. Hummell, Adm'r v. Moore,
25 Fed. 380 (C. C. D. Colo. 1885); New York I. & P. Co. v. Milburn Gin & Machine Co.,
35 Fed. 225 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 188S); Bennett v. Forrest, 69 Fed. 421 (D. Alaska, 1895).
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